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ABSTRACT
This article stems from a project launched by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2017 to examine the degree to which Buddhism 
might complement or enhance international humanitarian law (IHL), also 
known as ‘the law of war’ or ‘the law of armed conflict’. Given that 
Buddhist teachings discourage violence, scholarship has critiqued 
Buddhists’ involvement in armed conflict rather than considered how 
Buddhism might contribute to regulating the conduct of hostilities once 
war has broken out. Yet the Buddhist aim to reduce suffering is particularly 
relevant during armed conflict, and the empirical realism of early Buddhist 
texts shows that early Buddhist communities were very much aware of its 
grim reality. The article investigates the evidence for this empirical realism 
before exploring a range of concepts, doctrines and practices from within 
Buddhism that are pertinent to the recognition and implementation of IHL 
principles and the conduct of war. While IHL lays down explicit rules to 
follow during war, Buddhism emphasises broader ethical principles to be 
applied, so as not to dilute its ideal of non-violence. At a deeper level, it 
addresses the intention or motivation of parties to armed conflict, and 
possesses psychological insights and resources to help change their 
behaviour.
Though one might conquer a thousand times a thousand men in battle, the 
greatest conquest is of just one: oneself 
Dhammapada v. 103 (translation Peter Harvey)
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Introduction
In 2017, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a project on 
Buddhism and international humanitarian law (IHL), otherwise known as the ‘law 
of war’ or the ‘law of armed conflict’, which regulates the means and methods of 
warfare. The aim was to explore correspondences between Buddhism and IHL, 
and investigate how Buddhism might help to regulate hostilities and reduce 
suffering during armed conflict on its own terms. Given that Buddhism is in 
origin a renouncer religion which discourages war and violence, it is often 
assumed that it has little to say about the conduct of hostilities once wars 
break out, and most humanitarian interventions in the Buddhist world have 
focused instead on how Buddhism can contribute to preventing or resolving 
armed conflict and coming to terms with its aftermath. Yet Buddhism has never 
shied away from recognising and considering the grim reality of war.
The work of Stephen Jenkins, particularly his article ‘Once the Buddha was 
a Warrior: Buddhist Pragmatism in the Ethics of Peace and Armed Conflict’ 
(2017), and Upinder Singh’s Political Violence in Ancient India (2017) illustrate 
Buddhism’s deep familiarity with armed conflict and its tacit acceptance that 
rulers are sometimes required to utilise restrained military force to defend 
their people. They show how Buddhist thinkers have sought to influence 
leaders to moderate the ways in which they wield power and govern, warning 
them of the negative consequences of failure to do so for them and their 
kingdoms. Meanwhile, Sugiki’s work (2020a, 2020b) examines measures that 
Buddhists considered in order to avoid killing during conflict. While 
Buddhism acknowledges that monks and nuns must necessarily distance 
themselves from war on their path to liberation, lay Buddhists, including 
rulers and soldiers, must seek to minimise suffering whilst fulfiling their 
worldly duties and responsibilities, not least to protect people from attack 
and improve the conditions of those for whom they are responsible, espe-
cially the vulnerable. The Buddha’s oft-cited statement ‘I teach suffering and 
the cessation of suffering’ (Mn.I.140, Sam.III.119, and Bodhi 2013) is particu-
larly relevant to armed conflict, where suffering is at its most extreme.
The ICRC project responded to a gap in research with regard to Buddhist 
teachings on conduct during war, as opposed to before war, or after it – when 
it is generally too late to reverse much of the damage. Though there are 
hundreds of millions of Buddhists around the world, many in countries that 
are or have been affected by warfare, there has so far been no systematic and 
focused study on Buddhist guidance regarding the conduct of war or the 
interface between Buddhism and IHL. While in one respect this project is an 
academic survey of Buddhist teachings relevant to the conduct of war, it is 
also undertaken for an important practical application: the intention is to use 
Buddhism for what it was designed for: to reduce suffering, and to do so 
where it is most prevalent.
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This article therefore examines areas of convergence between Buddhism 
and IHL in order to establish the potential applicability of Buddhism to 
reducing suffering during armed conflict. It reflects some themes that 
emerged when developing a position paper initially compiled as the spring-
board for an ICRC conference on the subject, held in Dambulla, Sri Lanka, 
from 4 to 6 September 2019. Entitled ‘Reducing Suffering During Armed 
Conflict: The Interface between Buddhism and International Humanitarian 
Law’, the conference brought together a broad spectrum of international 
Buddhist scholars, members of the Buddhist clergy, legal experts, humanitar-
ian workers and military personnel from around the world.1 A selection of 
revised articles from the conference, which build upon as well as fill out gaps 
in the coverage here, will be published in due course.
This article first explains the rationale of the ICRC project, identifying the 
pioneering but minimal material available on this subject prior to the pro-
ject’s commencement. It then gives a brief explanation of IHL. Next, 
we explore the evidence for empirical realism in relation to war in early 
Buddhist texts, and how it is that a religion with a reputation for ‘non- 
violence’ (ahiṃsā) comes to have teachings and historical examples of rele-
vance to conduct within war. We review attitudes to killing during armed 
conflict and the different roles and expectations of monks and the lay 
Buddhists – whether rulers or soldiers – who generally engage in war. We 
then draw on a number of themes from Buddhist teachings and history that 
relate to the reduction of suffering during armed conflict. To do this, we have 
drawn primarily on a range of Buddhist textual authorities and historical 
examples for episodes relevant to the discussion of IHL in a Buddhist context. 
The texts include passages from the Pali Canon and commentaries, represen-
tative of early Buddhism and Theravāda, as well as Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna 
texts from India and elsewhere, important in Central, Himalayan and East 
Asian Buddhism. The article also touches occasionally upon other Buddhist 
teachings, practices and lived examples, and considers how Buddhism draws 
on elements and considerations within its cultural milieu, particularly in 
relation to law and the practicalities of seeking to reduce suffering in the 
wider world.
Rationale for the ICRC project
The core of IHL is formed by the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols. Its purpose is to minimise suffering during armed conflict by 
protecting those who are not – or are no longer – participating in hosti-
lities, and by regulating the means and methods of warfare. At Buddhism’s 
core is the recognition of suffering and the promotion of means to 
alleviate it, by challenging our understanding and making changes to 
our conduct. Buddhism has applied these means both to the quest for 
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salvation and to the troubles that afflict society. In grappling with the 
reality of suffering, including war, throughout its long history, it has 
produced a sophisticated analysis of its socio-economic and other causes. 
This suggests a degree of convergence between the aims of Buddhism and 
those of IHL, as well as some important differences that might help 
complement and develop it.
Dialogue between these domains can promote knowledge of both IHL and 
Buddhist resources relevant to the regulation of armed conflict, which can be 
mobilised accordingly. Insofar as IHL resonates with Buddhist values, or as IHL 
and Buddhism otherwise align, this should help legitimise IHL and motivate 
and support Buddhists to comply with it. Buddhist resources that might 
otherwise have been neglected are thereby repurposed for contemporary 
armed conflict. To whatever degree parties to conflict identify as Buddhist, 
this might also help influence their behaviour and foster an attitude of 
restraint. While Western-style military culture has overtaken militaries and 
armed groups in many Buddhist countries, this project offers the possibility 
that Buddhists might reclaim something of their religious or cultural identity, 
the legacy of Buddhism’s 2500-year long struggle to limit – more or less 
successfully – the horrors of war.
Previous writings of relevance
When we began to explore this subject, while the coverage of Buddhist 
approaches to violence and warfare was reasonably extensive, and 
a certain amount of attention had been paid to Buddhism and law, as 
well as Buddhism and human rights, consideration of Buddhist 
approaches to conduct within warfare and the legal parameters that 
delimit it was thin on the ground. A notable exception is the writing of 
Sri Lankan-born jurist Christopher Gregory Weeramantry (1926–2017), who 
served as judge at the International Court of Justice from 1991 to 2000. 
Weeramantry identifies the significance of this as a potential area of 
research, writing:
Buddhism being a very practical religion does have many insights to offer which 
could be useful in the application and development of modern humanitarian 
law. The matter assumes practical relevance also because Buddhist states are 
not without their standing armies. It is essential that the great depth of Buddhist 
teaching which has relevance to every aspect of humanitarian conduct should 
be brought to the attention of the armed forces in these and other countries . . . 
the teachings contained in the revered texts of the great religions are 
a powerful source of inspiration, and the Buddhist scriptures can be brought 
into these discussions for stressing the importance of humanitarian conduct 
during military action. (Weeramantry 2007, 3)
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A further exception is another Sri Lankan author who has sought to apply 
Buddhism to the iniquities of the modern world, the founder of the Sarvodaya 
Shramadana Movement, A. T. Ariyaratne (b. 1931). Despite its brevity, 
Ariyaratne’s 2003 essay ‘Buddhism and International Humanitarian Law’ pro-
vides an exemplary survey of Buddhist texts and historical examples relevant 
to the maintenance of IHL, ‘minimizing the after-effects of a conflict and 
giving as much relief as possible to all affected human beings’ (Ariyaratne 
2003, 15). More recently, Sri Lankan monk and academic Karagaswewe Wajira, 
in his article ‘Live and Let Others Live’, provided another brief but informative 
addition to the exploration of Pali Buddhist texts relevant to IHL (Wajira 2015).
This facility in Sri Lanka for considering the applicability of Buddhism to 
international law was seen already in the writings of Weeramantry’s contem-
porary, K. N. Jayatilleke (1920–1970), professor of philosophy at the University 
of Peradeniya. Trained in both Buddhist and Western philosophy, Jayatilleke 
led the way in considering convergences between Buddhist and other sys-
tems of thought. In 1967, he published his Hague Lectures, a series of five far- 
ranging explorations of Buddhist systems of law and their applicability to 
society in general. The fifth, on ‘Buddhism and International Law’, gives 
serious consideration to the duties of the state both internally and interna-
tionally, picking out both scriptural and historical examples (Jayatilleke 1967, 
534–563).
An important survey of Buddhist attitudes to and engagement in war, 
which includes some examples of Buddhist teachings to minimise the vio-
lence of war, is provided by Professor of Buddhist Studies, Lambert 
Schmithausen (1996, 1999). Schmithausen, who has pioneered the study of 
the history of Buddhist ethics in a number of areas with close consideration of 
textual sources from across different schools of Buddhism, adduces several of 
the sources discussed in more detail below. Schmithausen examines how the 
Buddha avoided explicitly tackling the conduct of war, and how even 
Buddhist kings were therefore guided in their conduct by non-Buddhist 
sources concerned primarily with gaining and sustaining power. From early 
Buddhism onwards, some Buddhists nevertheless sought to sustain the ideal 
of non-violence, at least to some degree, even while conducting war. 
Meanwhile, professor of religions Sallie B. King has published extensively on 
engaged Buddhism and peace activism. While not explicitly about IHL, her 
‘War and Peace in Buddhist Philosophy’ (2013) also provides an important 
survey of Buddhist attitudes to violence, drawing on multiple texts and 
historical examples. Like Jayatilleke and Schmithausen, she draws from 
a representative range of Buddhist traditions, encompassing both 
Theravāda and Mahāyāna sources and episodes.
Upinder Singh’s book Political Violence in Ancient India (2017) illustrates 
Buddhism’s deep familiarity with armed conflict and its tacit acceptance that 
rulers are sometimes required to utilise restrained military force to defend 
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their people. The work of Stephen Jenkins, particularly his article ‘Once the 
Buddha was a Warrior: Buddhist Pragmatism in the ethics of Peace and Armed 
Conflict’ (2017), examines jātaka stories about the Buddha’s previous lifetimes 
and Mahāyāna literature to identify Buddhist attitudes to engaging in war-
fare, arguing that, far from seeing only a pacifist approach, we find multiple 
examples of skilful engagement in war as a measure of last resort, with 
moderation and compassionate intentions serving personal and political 
interests. This practical approach is the focus of the recent work by Sugiki 
(2020a, 2020b). He examines the fourth- to sixth-century Mahāyāna text the 
Ārya-satyaka-parivarta (‘Noble Discourse of the Truth-Teller’) for ways in 
which a king, forced into a war he has sought to avoid in order to protect 
his people, may escape the karmic consequences of killing in part through his 
motivations of protection and compassion, including towards the enemy 
(Sugiki 2020a). Sugiki also looks at early Buddhist thinking on how, given 
the reality of warfare, Buddhists might confront it without killing, identifying 
three main methods, namely retreat, resolution and fighting without killing 
(Sugiki 2020b, 4). The last point is the one most relevant to IHL, because of the 
focus on minimising suffering, ideally achieved – according to his Buddhist 
sources – by capturing the opponent alive and committing them to an oath 
of peaceful conduct, then releasing them, or by fighting to disarm rather than 
kill (Sugiki 2020b, 14). Sugiki shows that the narratives about Buddhists forced 
to engage in warfare draw on methods outlined in ancient non-Buddhist 
Indian treatises on how to govern, such as the Arthaśāstra, but adapt them in 
order to accommodate the motivation to avoid killing (Sugiki 2020b, 15–16).
An important recent contribution, engaging with the realities and practi-
calities of war from a modern Buddhist practitioner perspective, is in the 
penultimate volume of Inquiring Mind. The semi-annual magazine, founded 
within the vipassanā practitioner community of North America and widely 
distributed in US prisons, gave serious consideration to practical morality in 
difficult circumstances. Its Spring 2014 issue gathered short articles, poems 
and reflections on the engagement of Buddhists in warfare and the moral 
dilemmas thus confronted (Gates and Senauke 2014). Many of the sources 
noted by these pioneering authors are taken up in the discussion of themes 
below, after a short explanation of IHL.
International humanitarian law (IHL)
IHL2 – also known as ‘the law of war’ or ‘the law of armed conflict’ – is a set of 
rules that seeks to limit the humanitarian effects of armed conflict. It protects 
the lives and dignity of persons who do not, or no longer, participate in 
hostilities, and imposes limits on the means and methods of warfare. The core 
of IHL comprises the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which have achieved 
universal ratification, and their Additional Protocols. Warfare has always been 
6 A. BARTLES-SMITH ET AL.
subject to certain principles and customs. It may therefore be said that IHL 
has its roots in the rules of ancient civilisations and religions, not least those 
of China and the Indian subcontinent, which institutionalised rules of warfare 
often far in advance of Western civilisations of the time. Universal codification 
of IHL began in the nineteenth century under the influence of Henri Dunant 
and the other founding fathers of the ICRC, notably through the adoption of 
the original Geneva Convention of 1864. Since then, nation states have 
agreed to and codified a series of practical rules to keep pace with evolving 
means and methods of warfare and their related humanitarian consequences.
IHL strikes a careful balance between humanitarian concerns and the 
military requirements of states and non-state parties to armed conflict. It 
addresses a broad range of issues, including protection for wounded and sick 
combatants; treatment of prisoners of war and other persons detained in 
connection with an armed conflict; protection for the civilian population and 
of civilian objects; and restrictions on the use of certain weapons (such as 
biological and chemical weapons and anti-personnel mines). As a general 
rule, IHL prohibits means and methods of warfare that cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering, or which cause severe damage to the natural 
environment. Other prohibited methods of warfare include pillage, starvation 
and perfidy (e.g. feigning protected status).
IHL requires that certain categories of people and objects must be pro-
tected during armed conflict. For example, the wounded and the sick must be 
protected from attack and must be collected and cared for by the party in 
whose power they find themselves. Medical personnel, units and transports 
must all be respected and protected. Protected civilian objects include cul-
tural property, places of worship and objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population (such as crops and water reservoirs), as well as works 
and installations containing dangerous forces (such as dams and nuclear 
power plants). Humanitarian relief personnel should be respected and pro-
tected – and access to humanitarian assistance for the civilian population 
affected by the conflict must be facilitated, subject to the consent of the 
parties concerned. IHL forbids killing or wounding an enemy who surrenders. 
In addition, detailed rules govern the conditions of detention for prisoners of 
war and the treatment of civilians under the authority of an enemy power. 
Outrages to personal dignity, such as rape and torture, are prohibited.
IHL also regulates the general conduct of hostilities on the basis of three 
core principles: distinction, proportionality and precaution. The principle of 
distinction requires that the parties to an armed conflict distinguish at all 
times between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and combatants 
and military objectives on the other, and that attacks may only be directed 
against combatants and military objectives. The purpose of this is to protect 
individual civilians, civilian property and the civilian population as a whole. 
Under this principle, indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. The principle of 
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proportionality, a corollary to the principle of distinction, dictates that inci-
dental loss of civilian life and property or injury to civilians must not be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated. In order to implement the restrictions and prohibitions on targeting, 
the principle of precaution requires all parties to an armed conflict to take 
specific precautions, such as, when conducting an attack, to verify that 
targets are military objectives or to give the civilian population an effective 
warning before the attack. It can also entail restrictions on the timing and 
location of an attack. For their part, defenders must not use human shields 
and should take precautions to protect the civilian population against the 
effects of attacks (such as locating bases away from densely populated 
areas).3
IHL is part of international law – the body of rules governing relations 
between states, made up primarily of treaties, customary rules and general 
principles of law. The difference should be noted between IHL, which reg-
ulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict (a concept known 
in Latin as jus in bello), and another part of international law set out in the 
Charter of the United Nations, that regulates whether a state may rightfully 
resort to armed force against another state (known as the jus ad bellum). Thus, 
IHL applies only during armed conflict and offers no comment on whether the 
reasons for resorting to armed conflict were justified. Similarly, IHL does not 
concern itself with conflict prevention or resolution.
IHL regulates both international armed conflicts (between opposing 
states) and non-international armed conflicts (where at least one party is 
not a state). Whether a conflict meets the threshold of a non-international 
armed conflict (as opposed to, say, a riot or some other internal disturbance) 
depends on the factual situation on the ground. This includes the degree of 
organisation of the parties to the conflict as well as the degree of intensity 
and duration of the conflict. Organisation can be indicated by the existence of 
a command structure in a non-state armed group, or their ability to control 
territory; plan, coordinate and carry out military operations; and implement 
the basic obligations of IHL. Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions contains core provisions for the regulation of non- 
international armed conflict, and Additional Protocol II develops these 
further.
While IHL and international human rights law are complementary, and 
share some of the same aims – notably to protect the lives, health and dignity 
of individuals – they are very different in their origins, scope and formulation. 
Human rights law is more recent. It has its origins in certain national human 
rights laws influenced by the European Enlightenment, and only emerged as 
a branch of international law after the Second World War. While IHL applies 
only during armed conflict, human rights law applies, in principle, at all times, 
though governments may derogate from some obligations during public 
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emergencies that threaten the life of the nation. Rather than upholding the 
rights of the individual, IHL is generally formulated as a set of duties placed on 
parties to conflict to exercise restraint, especially to protect non-combatants. 
This necessarily entails a degree of military discipline and professionalism, 
and individual combatants are responsible for their actions – following orders 
is no defence for committing war crimes. Uniquely, therefore, IHL applies to 
states, non-state armed groups and individual combatants, whereas human 
rights law only binds states.4
States have an obligation to teach IHL rules to their armed forces and the 
general public. They must prevent violations and enact laws at the national 
level to punish the most serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols, which are regarded as war crimes. In addition, measures 
have also been taken to punish war crimes at the international level, including 
through tribunals for the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the 
creation of the International Criminal Court by the 1998 Rome Statute.
A Buddhist approach to conduct in armed conflict?
In ‘Buddhism and Humanitarian Law’, Weeramantry comments regarding 
Buddhism:
In a system where the institution of war is not recognized [as truly valid] there 
will naturally be little or no discussion of actual conduct in warfare. The applic-
able principles will need to be worked out with reference to its general princi-
ples regarding the dignity and sanctity of human life, its general principles 
relating to the treatment of and attitudes towards other human beings, its 
respect for nature and life-support systems and its concepts on proper beha-
viour in general. (2007, 3)
Weeramantry’s statement is useful in identifying Buddhism’s broad approach 
to war and therefore the importance of looking to both its explicit and its 
implicit principles. Buddhist canonical texts do in fact contain many references 
to war, and many military images, similes and metaphors, as well as references 
to ways of mitigating the effects of war and of retaining one’s integrity 
in situations of conflict. Buddhism recognises that wherever ethically imperfect 
beings live, there will inevitably occur strife, disharmony, disputes and con-
flicts. For – until we reach the higher stages of spiritual development – our 
social behaviour is influenced by unwholesome (akusala) psychological traits 
rooted in the three core defilements of greed/lust, anger/hatred and ignor-
ance/delusion, with the narrowness of vision that stems from the last of these.
According to the Buddha, such conflicts arise within every conceivable 
social grouping ranging from the smallest, the family, to those of the highest 
complexity, such as politically organised states (Mn.I.86). As Bhikkhu Bodhi 
writes,
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The Buddha’s discourses give us glimpses into the tumultuous tide of the era. 
They tell how ‘men take up swords and shields, buckle on bows and quivers, 
and charge into battle . . . where they are wounded by arrows and spears, and 
their heads are cut off by swords . . . and they are splashed with boiling liquids 
and crushed under heavy weights’ (MN 13:12–13). We read of battlefields 
marked by ‘clouds of dust, the crests of the standards, the clamor, and the 
blows’ (AN 5:75). Rulers obsessed by lust for power executed their rivals, 
imprisoned them, confiscated their property, and condemned them to exile 
(AN 3:69). (Bodhi 2014)
As will be discussed in more detail below, the Buddha famously stated that 
warriors who die when engaged in fighting go to the ‘Battle-Slain Hell’, 
because of their inevitable state of mind upon death. Indeed, there are 
indications from the earliest days of Buddhism that some rulers and soldiers 
found the contradiction between Buddhist teachings of non-violence and 
war hard to bear, including kings who chose to surrender their kingdoms 
rather than fight (Jenkins 2017, 161; Sugiki 2020b). Nonetheless, the Buddha 
did not enjoin the rulers of his day to dispense with their armies, and ideal 
kings were expected to maintain a professional army to defend their people 
(Jenkins 2017, 162). Soldiering does not feature as one of the five prohibited 
livelihoods or forms or commerce – although trading in weapons does (An. 
III.208; Florida 2013, 331). Indeed, when members of the military profession 
became lay disciples of the Buddha, he encouraged them to follow the 
precepts and undertake acts of generosity, but did not ask them to leave 
their profession. Meanwhile, the jātaka tales of the past lives of the Buddha – 
a primary reference for Buddhist statecraft – are replete with narratives of 
how as a king, warrior, weapon-master, war minister, war horse and war 
elephant, among other incarnations, he sought to minimise the suffering of 
war (Jenkins 2017, 167). As Jenkins points out, in multiple previous lives the 
Buddha was a war hero (2017, 162).
The empirical realism of early Buddhist texts, then, shows that the histor-
ical Buddha and early Buddhist communities were very much aware of the 
reality of armed conflict, and that conflict and soldiering are woven into their 
narratives. To give another example by way of illustrating the pervasiveness 
of this familiarity, we can examine an episode in which the Buddha draws on 
the imagery of warfare when teaching his own son, Rāhula. Rāhula was 
ordained when still a child, and the Buddha gave him simplified instruction. 
Teaching Rāhula of the dangers of lying, the Buddha uses a simile of two war 
elephants. One war elephant fights for his rider with every part of his body 
with the exception of his trunk, which he keeps back. The other war elephant 
gives everything to killing, including his trunk, and his rider thinks:
This royal tusker with tusks as long as chariot poles . . . performs his task in 
battle . . . [the passage provides a detailed description of the elephant and 
exactly how he fights] also with his trunk. He has given up his life. Now there 
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is nothing this royal tusker elephant would not do. So too, Rāhula, when one is 
not ashamed to tell a deliberate lie, there is no evil, I say, that one would not do. 
(Mn.I.414–5, abridged from translation by Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 524)5
By keeping something of himself back, the first elephant retains an element 
of dignity or integrity. The second elephant, who uses even his trunk, has 
acquired the taste for killing and his rider realises there is nothing he would 
not do. While the purpose of the simile is to teach Rāhula the protective value 
of honesty as the basis for ensuring one’s personal integrity, it also indicates 
to us two things. The first is a detailed familiarity with warfare; the second is 
the understanding of the effect that battle can have on the combatant, on 
their mentality, judgement and integrity. The ideal combatant keeps some-
thing back, a restraint that prevents excesses. Such restraint, recognisably 
essential to the IHL principles of humanity, military necessity, distinction, 
proportionality and precaution, here protects the combatant.
The symbolic depiction of force or violence is also harnessed in Buddhism. 
It fulfils a variety of functions, such as to warn about the consequences of bad 
actions, aid personal transformation, redirect energy to treat one’s own flaws 
as enemies, sublimate negative forces and develop empathy. 
Examples include the depiction of Buddhist hells with karmic fruits in the 
form of terrible tortures; the sublimation of negative passions and the pre-
sence of wrathful deities in the Vajrayāna tradition;6 the ritual killing (using, 
for instance, paper puppets and fire) at the core of some Japanese esoteric 
practice (Gray 2007); and the advice to wage war on one’s own defilements in 
the Bodhicaryāvatāra (Chapter 4, vv. 28–47). The Bodhicaryāvatāra, a highly 
influential treatise composed by the seventh- to eighth-century Indian monk 
Śāntideva, also draws on the imagination of violence and humiliation in order 
to learn complete empathy for the perspective and experience of one’s 
enemy (Chapter 8, vv. 140–154, see below).
Given this familiarity with the realities of warfare, and the close analysis of 
its effects, minimising its trauma naturally follows from Buddhism’s concern 
to overcome ‘suffering’, dukkha, a term that covers both actual suffering and 
all kinds of lack of security. Furthermore, Buddhism’s analysis of our propen-
sity for violence and methods to redirect such tendencies also suggests 
potential contributions to the regulation of conflict.
Monastic ethics
While the texts cited indicate a familiarity with the presence of warfare, we 
might ask what insights about ideal conduct in war we might realistically 
expect to find given that Buddhism is in origin a renouncer religion, and, as 
hinted at by Weeramantry, provides in its earliest texts multiple prohibitions 
on killing. The community of monks and nuns (Sangha) was established for 
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those who wanted to renounce ordinary lay life in order to commit their lives 
to practising the Buddha’s teaching. For them, there is provided a set of 
regulations collectively called the vinaya, ‘discipline’. Sure enough, one of the 
most serious rules prohibits intentionally bringing about the death of 
a human being, even if it is still a foetus, whether by killing the person, 
arranging for an assassin to kill the person, inciting the person to kill them-
selves, or describing the advantages of death (Vin.III.73). Although killing an 
animal is a lesser offence, as soon as a monk is ordained, he is told, ‘When 
a monk is ordained, he should not intentionally deprive a living being of life, 
even if it is only an ant’ (Vin.I.97, Vin.IV.124–125). Involvement in the business 
of warfare and killing is also prohibited: there may be no watching of battles 
or military exercises, staying with the military or discussing military engage-
ments (Dn.I.7 and 178, Harvey 2000, 254). (We shall look at the marked 
exception to these regulations in the later development of warrior- and 
soldier-monks below.)
In no recorded instance did he [the Buddha] approve of killing any living being 
at all. When one of his monks went to an executioner and told the man to kill his 
victims compassionately, with one blow, rather than torturing them, the 
Buddha expelled the monk from the saṅgha, on the grounds that even the 
recommendation to kill compassionately is still a recommendation to kill – 
something he would never condone. If a monk was physically attacked, the 






hānissaro goes on to point out, while violence in self-defence is per-
mitted, it is not advocated. In the Simile of the Saw, Kakacūpama Sutta, 
patient loving-kindness is described as the ideal mental state even when 
under lethal attack: ‘Monks, as low-down thieves might carve one limb from 
limb with a double-handed saw, yet even then whoever entertained hate in 
his heart on that account would not be one who carried out my teaching’ 
(Mn.I.129). A similar message is found in the Khantivādi Jātaka (no. 313, Jat. 
III.39–43) on the Buddha-to-be (bodhisatta/bodhisattva in Pali/Sanskrit) in 
a previous lifetime as a Teacher of Patience (khanti) who is cut to pieces by 
an arrogant king without his patient forbearance wavering (Harvey 2000, 
105–107). The Mahāyāna Brahmajāla Sūtra teaches:
As a disciple of the Buddha, he [or she] must not even avenge the death of his 
parents – let alone kill sentient beings! He should not store any weapons or 
devices that can be used to kill sentient beings. If he deliberately does so, he 
commits a secondary offense. (Buddhist Text Translation Society 1981)
We do see the acknowledgement of at least the threat of violence as an 
important tool in ensuring appropriate conduct, however. The vinaya 
describes how the followers of the monks Assaji and Punabbasu were badly 
behaved and in need of disciplining. In response, the Buddha sends his 
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leading disciples, the monks Sāriputta and Moggallāna, to carry out a formal 
act of banishment (pabbājaniya-kamma) against them. When Sāriputta and 
Moggallāna point out that the monks they are to tackle are fierce and rough – 
implying that the action might be difficult to carry out – the Buddha tells 
them to take many other monks with them (Vin.II.12). That is, a potential 
threat of physical violence is deterred by a non-violent show of force. 
Punishments for lapses from discipline in the vinaya, though, range from 
expulsion to verbal rebuke. They do not include any physical punishments.
The vinaya is in large part a legal system, still functioning some two-and 
-a-half millennia since its compilation began. While it contains rules and 
judgements, it also contains stretches of narrative which allow those rules 
to be explored in relation to practical realities – a kind of case law. Each 
potential infringement of vinaya is analysed by five criteria recognisable in 
a modern jurisprudence: whether an effort was made that contributed to the 
offence, whether the object is pertinent (i.e. was a human being the target, in 
the case of the rule prohibiting murder?), whether the accused had the 
perception of the object as such (so did the accused see that and understand 
that a human was present?), whether there was intention (did the accused 
intend to kill?) and whether the outcome happened (was someone killed?) 
(T
_
hānissaro 2013). As such, it has also informed the development of law in the 
Buddhist world, and is relevant to the regulation of armed conflict in number 
of contexts because of the methods it developed for dealing with proble-
matic situations involving multiple parties.
Lay ethics
Most authoritative Buddhist literature was preserved by and for monastics, 
whereas warfare is – with some exceptions – conducted by lay people, i.e. 
non-monastics, the most relevant of which are rulers and military personnel. 
Though lay Buddhists may be influenced by some of the principles of mon-
asticism, and are expected to strive to keep the five precepts, the first of 
which is not to cause loss of life, they are not expected to follow the monastic 
rules. Canonical texts testify to the view that the straight path to the goal is 




hapāla Sutta (Mn.II.54– 
74) says, the lay life could be lived doing karmically beneficial deeds while 
enjoying pleasures. This is the samsaric life which hopefully leads to a good 
rebirth, not Nirvanic liberation from all rebirths, the ultimate goal of the 
Buddhist spiritual path.7
Buddhist literature contains information pertinent to the discussion of lay 
practice and the conduct of warfare for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
vinaya provide rules and guidance for monastics that are designed to 
maintain a context within which spiritual transformation is possible and to 
ensure harmony both within the monastery and with its host society. The 
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extensive detail the vinaya and other monastic texts offer when considering 
practical matters relating to these concerns means that they are a useful 
resource for developing principles that are relevant to all Buddhists. 
Secondly, many teachings, especially those in the other sections of the 
Buddhist canons, are specifically focused on practical ethics that are not 
confined to the activities of monks and nuns, giving us ample material on 
ethical behaviour more broadly, including in warfare. Thirdly, some of the 
principles have over the course of history been applied specifically to those 
who wield power, as well as to those who seek to influence and modify how 
that power is applied, directly touching on the use of deadly force and 
engagement in wars.
In relation to this third point above, namely the use of Buddhist teachings 
and principles to influence and modify how temporal power is wielded, 
Buddhist monks throughout history, beginning with the Buddha himself, 
have found themselves in the position of offering guidance to rulers. This 
means that in addition to teachings aimed at monastics and lay people, 
Buddhist texts from the earliest times frequently contain guidance for those 
in power, and while this may have been quite general in the earliest period, 
a separate, more detailed genre of literature dedicated to such guidance 
developed over time in many Buddhist cultures. Much of that guidance 
pertains to rulers exerting their power with skill and restraint.
Common humanity and interdependence
A fundamental basis of IHL is the recognition and valuing of our common 
humanity.8 A similar principle underlies Buddhist ethics: as all want to avoid 
suffering and enjoy happiness, one should treat others with the same regard 
one does oneself (Sam.V.353–354). This is enhanced by the principle of 
samatā (‘equality’), important in many Mahāyāna sūtras, based on our shared 
make-up of the same components of reality. This principle of shared experi-
ence extends to all living beings, not just fellow humans, although humans 
are more valued because to gain a human rebirth is seen as a rare and 
precious opportunity for moral and spiritual growth, indicative of past good 
karma (Mn.III.169; Harvey 2000, 30).
The Bodhicaryāvatāra encapsulates the idea that all beings are equal in 
their desire for happiness and dislike of pain:
When happiness is liked by me and others equally, what is so special about 
me that I strive after happiness only for myself? When fear and suffering are 
disliked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I protect 
myself and not the other? If I give them no protection because their suffering 
does not afflict me, why do I protect my body against future suffering when it 
does not afflict me [now]? (Bca.8, vv. 95–97, translation Crosby and Skilton 
1995, 96)
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We see these values expressed by Buddhist teachers in the modern world. 
The Dalai Lama, who is deeply influenced by the Bodhicaryāvatāra, teaches 
that we are ‘truly a global family’ and by necessity must develop a sense of 
‘universal responsibility’ (Piburn 1990, 17): ‘It is our collective and individual 
responsibility to protect and nurture the global family, to support its weakest 
members and to preserve and tend to the natural environment in which we 
all live’ (Piburn 1990, 114). For IHL, this clearly is applicable in terms of the 
treatment of the wounded, sick and displaced, and those detained in relation 
to armed conflict, as well as to the environment that supports all commu-
nities affected by war.
Recognition and valuing of our common humanity is the point underlying 
a story in which the Buddha intervenes to prevent a war between his own 
people and another group. The farmers of two groups both begin quarrelling 
after a drop in the water level in a dammed river which both use to irrigate 
their crops. When this dispute escalates towards war, the Buddha intervenes, 
persuading the military leaders of both camps that they are about to sacrifice 
something of great value – the lives of their warriors – for something of very 
little value – water (Dhp-a.III.254–256; Jat.V.412–414; Deegalle 2014, 567– 
569).9
Extending this recognition of common humanity even to the enemy was 
fundamental to the success of another modern Buddhist teacher, the monk 
and nominee for the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, Mahā Ghosānanda (1913–2007). 
At the United Nations (UN)-sponsored peace talks following the civil war in 
Cambodia, he urged compromise and non-violence, accepting the inclusion 
of Khmer Rouge personnel in an interim government with the following 
words: ‘We must have both wisdom and compassion. We must condemn 
the act, but we cannot hate the actor. With our love, we will do everything we 
can to assure peace for all. There is no other way’ (Ghosananda 1992, 20–21). 
Other comments of Ghosānanda reflect the benefits of this emphasis on 
shared humanity:
[A]n end to antagonism, not the antagonists. This is important. The opponent 
has our respect. We implicitly trust his or her human nature and understand that 
ill-will is caused by ignorance. By appealing to the best in each other, both of us 
achieve the satisfaction of peace. Gandhi called this a ‘bilateral victory’. 
(Ghosananda 1992, 62)
While Ghosānanda’s comments were made in the context of peace talks, they 
pertain to IHL, according to which combatants should aim to win the war with 
minimal human suffering, not to exterminate the enemy, following the rules 
rather than exacting vengeance. His statements even hint at a more detached 
approach towards accountability for past IHL violations.
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The doctrine of kamma/karma, ‘action’, i.e. that one creates key aspects of 
one’s future in this life and future lives through the intentional actions one 
undertakes now, is an important motivating factor for acting in accord with 
a recognition of the ‘common humanity’ – or, in Buddhism, ‘common sen-
tience’ – even of those seen as enemies. In traditional Buddhist cosmology, 
rebirth may be in any of five states: human, heavenly, animal, hungry ghost 
and hell being. The first two are regarded as good rebirths, indicating the 
maturation of previous good karma, while the last three are regarded as bad 
rebirths, the maturation of some previous negative karma. Since we all are 
reborn countless times in these different realms, the likelihood is that any 
other living being is or has been closely related to us in a previous lifetime 
(Sam.II.189–190). The group to which we currently belong may differ from 
that in previous lifetimes. Those of other ethnic groups, religions or nations, 
or on opposite sides in a conflict, were thus relatives or good friends in some 
past life, and may be again in a future life. The complexity of these relation-
ships is beyond the understanding of ordinary mortals – only a Buddha can 
fully assess the motivational state behind a person’s action and its full range 
of karmic results. The general principle is understood, however, as a basis for 
compassion and respect for all fellow-sentients, and for delimiting one’s 
conduct in conflict accordingly.
A corollary to the humanitarian principle of common humanity is that of 
impartiality, particularly with respect to prioritising assistance to the victims 
of armed conflict based solely on need. For Buddhism, an attitude of equa-
nimity and impartiality is greatly valued along with loving-kindness and 
compassion, as will be seen below in relation to the four positive mental 
attitudes. Further, the fourth of four Buddhist ‘foundations of social unity’ 
(saṅgaha-vatthu) is ‘consideration of the equal needs and aspiration of all 
others’ (samānattatā) (Dn.III.152, 232; An.II.32, 248; An.IV.218, 363; Harvey 
2000, 109–110). The influential Mahāyāna Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra says ‘In 
the midst of great battles, [bodhisattvas, the heroic saints on the path to 
Buddhahood who seek to save all living beings from suffering and saṃsāra] 
favour neither side. Greatly powerful Bodhisattvas delight in bringing people 
together in harmony’ (Chapter 7, Section 6, v. 27, Lamotte 1976, 185). This is 
relevant to the need for neutrality and impartiality by certain third parties 
active during armed conflict, such as members of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and other humanitarian organisations.
Minimising suffering during armed conflict
The goal of Buddhism, Nirvana, entails the understanding and elimination of 
dukkha – mental and physical pain – and its causes. As such, at their most 
fundamental level, Buddhism and IHL share a common purpose: the reduc-
tion of suffering. Buddhism identifies the causes of suffering as mental 
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processes and actions that are based in greed, hatred or delusion. These root 
defilements underlie all other negative or unskilful thoughts and deeds. 
Buddhism’s analysis of the psychological realities of the human condition is 
arguably its greatest potential contribution to reducing suffering during 
armed conflict. A set of positive mental attitudes that counteract these 
defilements, emphasised in Buddhism from its beginnings to the 
modern day, are the four states which lead to harmonious social relationships 
and human happiness:
● Loving-kindness (Pali mettā, Sanskrit maitrī): the attitude of hoping for 
the welfare and happiness of all beings, whatever their nature, and 
including those identified as ‘enemies’ or towards whom one initially 
feels animosity – the ideal attitude is the love and concern a caring 
mother feels towards her child;
● Compassion (karuṇā): the concern to reduce the suffering, and the 
causes of suffering, for sentient beings – this is clearly relevant to the 
care for the wounded, sick, detained and displaced during armed con-
flict; the ideal attitude is the empathy and compassion a caring mother 
shows towards her sick child;
● Empathetic joy (muditā): rejoicing at the happiness and success of others; 
this is the opposite of jealousy and clearly relevant to reduce the risk of 
gratuitous violence and the destruction of factors that could support the 
well-being of one’s military opponent; the ideal attitude is the joy a caring 
mother experiences when her child is well and successful;
● Equanimity (Pali upekkhā, Sanskrit upeks
_
ā): responding with calm to 
both the joys and sufferings of life, one’s own and that of others, and 
maintaining impartiality to all. Equanimity and impartiality are funda-
mental to functioning successfully within difficult circumstances.
Those who have not yet attained spiritual liberation might sometimes 
bring harm to others by their actions, but the teachings of early 
Buddhism make clear that even such ordinary people should at least 
minimise the causing of suffering and harm to themselves and to others 
likely to be affected by their actions (Mn.I.415, Mn.II.114–115). A common 
Pali chant expresses this intention: ‘ime sattā averā hontu abyāpajjhā, 
anīghā sukhī attānaṃ pariharantū’ti’, ‘May these beings be without 
hatred, without ill-will, without trouble and stress, may they be happy 
and preserve themselves’. Compassion is foundational for Mahāyāna 
Buddhists, as followed by Buddhists of Central, Himalayan and East 
Asia, the highest goal of which is to follow the path of the bodhisattva, 
who seeks to remove suffering for all beings.
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The First Buddhist precept of non-violence and the karmic 
consequences of killing
The Buddha was once asked if he approved of the killing of anything, and he 
replied:
Having killed anger, you sleep in ease.
Having killed anger, you do not grieve.
The noble ones praise the slaying of anger
– with its honeyed crest and poison root –
for having killed it you do not grieve. (Sam.I.41)
A fundamental and irrefutable value of Buddhism is non-violence. This is 
expressed in the first and most important of the Buddhist precepts, or 
‘training-rules’, which all Buddhists should strive to keep: ‘I undertake the 
precept to abstain from the destruction of living [lit. breathing] beings’ (Pali 
Pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṃ samādiyāmi). The Dhammika Sutta (Sn. 
v. 394) states that a lay person ‘should not kill a living being, nor cause it to 
be killed, nor should he incite another to kill. Do not injure any being, either 
strong or weak, in the world’. Of a person following this precept, it is said: 
‘Abandoning the destruction of living beings, he abstains from this; without 
stick or sword, scrupulous, compassionate, trembling for the welfare of all 
living beings’ (Mn.I.345, cf. Dn.I.4). Another canonical passage, An.IV.246, 
adds: 
Here, monks, a noble disciple gives up the destruction of life and abstains from 
it. By abstaining from the destruction of life the noble disciple gives to immea-
surable beings freedom from fear, hostility and oppression . . . [and thereby] . . . 
he himself will enjoy immeasurable freedom from fear, hostility and oppression.
The first precept is broken if a person intentionally causes death to any 
sentient being: human, animal, bird, fish or insect,whether they do so directly 
themselves or by directing another to do so. Through the law of karma, killing 
leads to suffering in this and future lives for the person who carried out, or 
ordered, the action.10 This interpretation of the first precept is in line with the 
IHL doctrine of command responsibility, which implicates all those in the 
chain of command for IHL violations. The Buddhist teaching is nevertheless 
more expansive, in that commanders are morally responsible for (and bear 
the karmic consequences associated with) all killing that happens on their 
watch, not just killing that is illegal.
The principle underlying the precepts is expressed in the Dhammapada, 
one of the most famous and most translated canonical texts, which consists 
of pithy aphorisms expressing succinct Buddhist teachings: ‘All beings trem-
ble at violence; life is dear to all. Comparing others with oneself, do not kill or 
cause another to kill’ (v. 130, translation Harvey).
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The Mahāyāna Brahmajāla Sūtra, particularly influential in China, expounds 
further on the theme of non-violence:
A disciple of the Buddha shall not himself kill, encourage others to kill, kill by 
expedient means, praise killing, rejoice at witnessing killing, or kill through 
incantation or deviant mantras. He [or she] must not create the causes, condi-
tions, methods, or karma of killing, and shall not intentionally kill any living 
creature. As a Buddha’s disciple, he ought to nurture a mind of compassion and 
filial piety, always devising expedient means to rescue and protect all beings. If 
instead, he fails to restrain himself and kills sentient beings without mercy, he 
commits a Parajika (major) offense. (Buddhist Text Translation Society 1981)
In the popular nineteenth-century Tibetan commentary Kun bzang bla ma’i 
zhal lung (Words of My Perfect Teacher), Patrul Rinpoche writes,
In the Sutra of Sublime Dharma of Clear Recollection (dam pa’i chos dran pa nye 
bar bzhag pa’i mdo), it is said that one will repay any life one takes with five 
hundred of one’s own lives, and that for killing a single being one will spend 
one intermediate kalpa [i.e. aeon] in the hells. . . . 
Indeed, unless you have the power to resuscitate your victims on the spot, there 
is no situation in which the act of killing does not defile you as a negative action. 
You can also be sure that it will harm the lives and activities of [one’s] teachers. 
(1998, 111)
Buddhists know that they should seek to avoid violence and killing. In the 
context of war, they might nonetheless be drawn into defensive fighting in 
order to protect their country or community. Elizabeth Harris, reflecting on 
early Buddhist texts, writes:
That [even] lay people should never initiate violence where there is harmony or use 
it against the innocent is very clear. That they should not attempt to protect those 
under their care if the only way of doing so is to use defensive violence is not so 
clear . . . The person who feels violence is justified to protect the lives of others has 
indeed to take the consequences into account. He has to remember that he is 
risking grave consequences for himself in that his action will inevitably bear fruit . . .. 
Such a person needs to evaluate motives . . .. Yet that person might still judge that 
the risks are worth facing to prevent a greater evil. (Harris 1994, 47–48)
In summary, from a Buddhist view, violence is wrong but understandable in 
certain circumstances. Even in such circumstances, killing is seen to arise from 
some mix of greed, aversion and delusion. Because of this it is also seen to plant 
seeds in the psyche that will naturally mature into unpleasant experiences and 
other results in the future for those that did the action (Gethin 2004, 2007, 70– 
71). This means that violence, even when associated with a good intention, 
bears some negative karmic consequences which have to be weighed against 
the consequences of not acting.11 Thus, as Peter Harvey writes,
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Buddhist combatants surely have a strong motive to limit the effects of their 
military violence in accord with IHL principles of distinction, proportionality and 
precaution. Both Buddhism and IHL aim to minimise harm and suffering, and 
while armed conflict will of course bring some of these, both Buddhist princi-
ples and IHL surely agree: the less, the better. (Harvey 2021, forthcoming)
Buddhism recognised and warned against the problem of amorality on the 
part of those who do not accept the fundamental principle of karma: that 
what you do matters.12 Consideration of the karmic consequences of harmful 
actions highlights that Buddhism sees this as arising in an automatic way, 
which need not, though of course can, involve external enforcement. This is – 
in principle – self-regulatory, an important quality in often anarchic conflict 
zones where government can break down or lack reach, and IHL rules are 
therefore difficult to enforce. The greater the degree to which IHL rules or 
equivalent Buddhist principles are internalised by combatants, the greater 
the chance that they will follow them in challenging and highly stressful 
conflict situations. As will be discussed further below, however, Buddhism 
does not rely only on self-regulation but advocates a system of reporting, 
assessing and – where necessary – punishing suspected breaches of expected 
conduct, both within its own monastic community and in society in general.
Intention and gradations of killing
A number of texts indicate that the negative karmic consequences of delib-
erately killing or harming a living being are worse when the violence is 
excessive, such as cruel acts in war. The Dhammapada vv. 137–140 identifies 
the seriousness of the effects if the victims are unarmed or otherwise innoc-
uous, showing close correspondence with IHL rules which protect civilians 
and combatants who are hors de combat (i.e. out of action):
He who inflicts violence on those who are unarmed, and offends those who are 
inoffensive, will soon come upon one of these ten states: Sharp pain, or disaster, 
bodily injury, serious illness, or derangement of mind, trouble from the king, or 
grave charges, loss of relatives, or loss of wealth, or houses destroyed by 
ravaging fire; upon dissolution of the body that ignorant man is born in hell. 
(translation Buddharakkhita 1985)
Buddhism also ranks degrees of killing according to both the underlying 
intention and the effort behind the act. While those who are unarmed and 
vulnerable should not be harmed, Buddhism also states that the more 
virtuous the person, the more problematic it is to harm them (Harvey 2000, 
52).13 There is a list of the five most heinous actions, called anantarika-karma, 
‘acts without interval [before the results take effect]’, so called because they 
lead to inevitable rebirth in hell in the next life immediately after death in this 
one. Four of these five concern killing – or, in the case of the Buddha, 
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attempting to kill – virtuous people: killing one’s mother or one’s father (i.e. 
those who gave one the opportunity of human life), killing an Arahat (enligh-
tened individual), or spilling the blood of a Buddha.14 Here is what the fifth- 
century commentator Buddhaghosa says on the subject of the effect of both 
virtue and effort on the severity of the outcome for one who kills:
‘Destruction of a living being’ . . . in regard to those without good qualities 
(guṇa-) – animals etc. – is of lesser fault when they are small, greater fault 
when they have a large physical frame. Why? Because of the greater effort 
involved. Where the effort is the same, (it is greater) because of the object 
(vatthu-) (of the act) being greater. In regard to those with good qualities – 
humans etc. – the action is of lesser fault when they are of few good qualities, 
greater fault when they are of many good qualities. But when size or good 
qualities are equal, the fault of the action is lesser due to the (relative) mildness 
of the mental defilements and of the attack, and greater due to their intensity. 
Five factors are involved: a living being, the actual perceiving of a living being, 
a thought of killing, the attack, and death as a result of it. There are six 
methods: with one’s own hand, by instigation, by missiles, by contrivance 
(trap or poison), by sorcery, by psychic power. (M-a.I.198, translation Harvey; 
cf. Khp-a.28–29, Asl.97, italics added)
The italicised section is particularly relevant to an army’s or soldier’s action of 
killing a human.
The importance of the intensity of effort and quality of object relates to 
the emphasis placed on cetanā, intention, in Buddhist moral causality. 
What determines the nature of the karmic ‘seed’ generated by an action 
is the will or volition behind it: ‘It is will (cetanā), O monks, that I call 
karma; having willed, one acts through body, speech or mind’ (An. 
III.415).15
Abhidhamma, a systematising approach to Buddhist teachings that 
developed in early Buddhism, seeks to explain causality especially as it 
relates to ethics and psychology. It understands some form of cetanā to 
be present in every moment of consciousness, and that cetanā determines 
the ethical quality of an action (Bodhi 2010, 80). Actions which are unskilful/ 
unwholesome (akusala) are seen as ones that are rooted in greed, hatred 
and/or delusion, and thus bring unpleasant karmic fruits (Mn.I.47, Harvey 
1995, 2010, 2000, 42–43, 46–49). Those which are skilful/wholesome (kusala) 
are seen as ones that are rooted in non-greed (generosity, renunciation), 
non-hatred (kindness, compassion) and/or non-delusion (clarity of mind, 
wisdom), and thus bring pleasant karmic fruits. The karmic effects of an 
act of killing will be worse when the roots are, for example, greed, hatred, 
anger, revenge or deluded prejudice than if the ill will/aversion involved in 
any act of intentional killing (Gethin 2007) is associated with the motive of 
protecting others. According to Abhidhamma, even actions linked to altru-
ism that entail killing bring with them a negative underlying intention to 
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kill. Positive reasons, such as protecting others, will have beneficial karmic 
consequences, alongside the negative ones that inevitably come from 
killing.
The discussions of intention and effort, alongside those of the virtue of the 
victim, suggest that killing a human is always worse than killing an animal. 
This accords with Buddhist monastic rules (vinaya), which stipulate that the 
penalty for deliberately killing a human is expulsion from the Sangha, one of 
only four offences that invoke this penalty. Meanwhile, killing an animal is 
only a lesser vinaya offence. However, Chinese vinaya master Daoxuan 道宣 
(596–667 CE), drawing on vinaya commentaries and treatises, emphasises 
that even though killing an animal is a lesser offence according to vinaya, the 
karmic consequences may nonetheless be more severe:
Daoxuan concludes that killing even an ant with evil intent (hai xin 害心) is 
worse than killing a human being with compassion (ci xin 慈心). . . . [T]he state 
of mind of the killer is crucial here . . .. He asserts that maliciously killing the ant 
will generate a more severe karmic effect than benevolently killing a human. . . . 
‘[S]ince there is no shame and not even a beginning of repentance, this is a non- 
benevolent state of mind . . .. As for the third [pārājika] rule on killing . . ., killing 
a perverted person is a lighter [offence] than killing an insect or an ant. The 
reason for this is that such a person is polluting the world and causing a lot of 
damage’. (Heirman 2020, 32–33)
Is compassionate killing possible?
When Daoxuan refers to killing with compassion, given his assessment of the 
killing of a human in terms of the harm that individual causes, he may well 
have had in mind a story found in the Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra. The Upāya- 
kauśalya Sūtra is a famous Mahāyāna text, often cited by philosophers of 
different Mahāyāna Buddhist schools, as well as by modern scholars, when 
addressing the question of whether the compassionate killing of a human 
being without an unskilful state of mind is possible, and whether it is there-
fore possible to kill and yet avoid a hellish rebirth. As such, it represents a re- 
evaluation of earlier teachings on the subject.
The name of the Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra, ‘The Skill-in-Means Sūtra’, indicates 
that it concerns the notion of strategy (upāya) or, more fully, skill-in-strategy 
(upāya-kauśalya), often translated as ‘skill-in-means’. Skill-in-means refers to 
skilfully attaining a goal, including by undertaking an otherwise ethically 
dubious action, such as lying or killing, because it leads to the best overall 
spiritual outcome of all involved. In the sūtra, the Buddha-to-be (bodhisattva) 
is a sea captain called Great Compassion on a ship transporting 500 mer-
chants, who are all themselves likewise bodhisattvas. In Mahāyāna, the notion 
of the bodhisattva was broadened, to encompass everyone as having the 
potential to aspire to become a future Buddha. The pantheon also expanded, 
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with the belief in multiple Buddhas existing at any one time. These two 
interrelated developments led to stories involving not just one bodhisattva, 
as found in the early jātaka stories, but many.
In a dream, deities inform the Captain Great Compassion that one of the 
passengers is a murderer intent on killing the 500 merchants. This puts him in 
a dilemma: if he tells the passengers, they may react by murdering the would- 
be murderer, an act of bad karma leading to hell and interrupting their 
spiritual progression; if he does nothing, the bodhisattvas will die and the 
murderer, having committed 500 counts of one of the worse bad actions 
imaginable, namely killing a bodhisattva, will, on his own death, be immedi-
ately reborn in hell. The captain comes to the conclusion that although he 
risks going to hell himself if he kills the would-be murderer, doing so is the 
best option in order to minimise overall suffering. Accepting his own fate, he 
proceeds to stab the would-be murderer, killing him, but thereby saving the 
latter from hell. The now-murdered would-be murderer goes to heaven. The 
captain, because he has accepted the possibility of hell for the benefit of 
others, and because his mind is therefore free from unskilful mental states, 
does not himself go to hell. This represents a shift from the absolutist position 
of non-violence, found in the earliest strata of Buddhist literature, to 
a relativist position, which accepts the option of committing violence if it 
offers the greatest overall benefit for the greatest number of people. This 
reflects the strong emphasis on the virtue of compassion in the bodhisattva 
path, especially within Mahāyāna. As the Bodhicaryāvatāra states, ‘Even that 
which is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will 
be of benefit’ (Bca Chapter V, v. 84; Crosby and Skilton 1995, 41).
Discussions of this and other narrative examples of compassionate killing 
confirm the possibility that high-level bodhisattvas who kill out of a genuine 
and well-considered concern to reduce the overall level of suffering may in fact 
kill in a skilful state of mind (Jenkins 2010). Just as there are gradations of 
killing in terms of the virtue of the victim, so too there are gradations in terms 
of how spiritually advanced the killer is. Because of the underlying intention, 
killing out of altruism incurs great merit (good action) rather than demerit 
(Jenkins 2010, 308–310).16 A number of important Mahāyāna philosophers 
over the centuries confirm this view, drawing on a range of narrative examples 
in which someone with good intention kills for the greater good. Tantric 
Buddhism further believes that high-level bodhisattvas may kill and direct 
the rebirth of their victim such that the victim is reborn in a Pure Land, 
a kind of paradise established by a Buddha to enable sentient beings to realise 
Awakening. Above, we looked at the nineteenth-century Tibetan commenta-
tor Patrul Rinpoche’s teaching against killing in his Words of My Perfect Teacher. 
The passage continues, ‘If you are not capable of transferring beings’ con-
sciousness to the state of great bliss, you should make every effort to avoid 
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taking their lives’. This final point emphasises that killing as skill-in-means, as 
outlined in the Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra, is only to be undertaken by the extre-
mely spiritually advanced, capable of ensuring a good rebirth for their victim.
Responses to military activity: the defence of Dharma argument 
and compensatory ethics
In the above examples of compassionate killing, the killing directly benefits 
the spiritual progress of the victim (who has, however, no say in the matter). 
Spiritual progress is the ultimate arbiter of benefit in Buddhist philosophy, 
which of course takes the debate beyond the immediate consideration of 
only a single lifespan and therefore beyond the parameters of IHL. The danger 
is that such affirmation of killing for the greater good can be misinterpreted 
as a licence for supposedly superior groups to eliminate less ‘enlightened’ 
enemies unencumbered by humanitarian restraint.
Schmithausen suggests that Buddhist ideals of non-violence, respect for 
the property of others, etc. as codified in the precepts ‘might have been 
quite welcome as a code of conduct for subjects (and hence there was good 
reason for kings to support Buddhism) but not for the rulers’ own activity 
which included execution and the employment of military force for defence 
as well as conquest’ (Schmithausen 1999, 53). Schmithausen thus suggests 
that rulers encouraged core Buddhist values among their peoples, but 
themselves pursued codes of conduct that advocated violence in shaping 
their governmental and military decisions. Schmithausen further suggests 
that the awareness of the bad karma of following these codes, and the 
tension between Buddhist ideals of non-violence and engagement in vio-
lence, inspired kings and members of the military to undertake acts of 
compensatory ethics or merit-making (Schmithausen 1999, 53), i.e. religious 
actions designed to make up for former harm. The idea is that practising 
mundane and this-worldly acts of generosity to the Sangha both supports 
Buddhism and, as good karma, generates karmic benefit or ‘merit’, puñña, 
for the donor. Such compensatory religious actions seem to have been 
undertaken throughout the history of Buddhism, according to Buddhist 
chronicles. Famous exemplars include the third-century Indian king 





hagāmaṇī, whose regret at harm done during warfare is described in 
a passage in the fifth-century Mahāvaṃsa. Compensatory ethics continues 
to be practised to this day, most visibly by some modern military figures and 
their families.
Compensatory ethics often takes the form of generosity (dāna), for exam-
ple by offering food and other requisites including religious buildings to the 
Sangha. Dāna is one of the 10 wholesome or meritorious actions and the 
beginning point of the 10 perfections of the bodhisattva. Those cynical about 
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such conduct might point out that dāna is only one Buddhist value among 
many, and can be very much this-worldly and even self-centred; ethical 
discipline (sīla), contemplative life, commitment to non-violence and com-




If your survival is accomplished without generosity, without virtue, without 
meditation, it’s not worth much. It’s not the sort of survival that keeps you 
healthy and well-nourished. You look at survivors of war, who had to go and kill 
and steal and cheat and bomb, and then go into a lot of denial about it. Look at 
all the veterans of past wars, emotionally scarred for life. They did survive, but at 
a huge cost, the cost of the skillful roots in the mind. It’s by nourishing the 
skillful roots that the health of the mind survives.
Some, then, in the context of uncertain political situations and daunting 
realities, see the use of force as an unfortunate necessity, and might seek 
to compensate for the bad karma by acts of generosity, including in the 
form of humanitarian relief. While Buddhism does not accept the idea 
that good karma cancels out bad karma, one may influence which karma 
comes to fruition first. Doing compensatory good may lead, through the 
fruition of that good karma more immediately, to a better life and 
rebirth, which in turn make future good action and thus one’s spiritual 
progression easier, despite the inevitable fruition of the bad karma. 
However, for some, the use of compensatory merit-making is hard to 
accept either because they hold an absolute pacifist interpretation of the 
Buddha’s teachings or because of the risk of manipulating such teachings 
to justify action undertaken for other, or mixed, reasons. Either way, 
Buddhism enjoins us to minimise the violence and suffering of armed 
conflict as far as possible once wars break out, for the benefit of all those 
involved. It developed guidance for rulers specifically to seek to minimise 
the effects of war and the abuse of power.
The Buddhist ideal of rulership and statecraft
The Buddhist ideal ruler is the non-violent cakravartin (‘Wheel-turning’, Pali 
cakkavatti) monarch who rules according to the ethical principles of the 
Dharma. He is himself ruled by Dharma (An.III.149). The concept of such 
a ruler is first found in the Pali Canon in the Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta (Dn.III. 
58–79).17 While he displays great power and has an army, a cakravartin 
discards military conquest, winning over potential enemies because of his 
ability to rule justly. The Buddha said that he had been a cakravartin 
monarch in some of his past lives, conquering the entire world without 
recourse to weapons (An.IV.89–90, cf. Dn.I.88–89; Dn.III.59). We can perhaps 
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relate this mythical ideal to the concept of soft power, or of humanitarian 
pressure nevertheless backed up by hard power. Guidance given to such 
a ruler in that text includes:
(1) Depend on Dhamma, . . . (2) arrange shelter, protection and defence for your 
family, army, [and other dependents in the realm including] . . . for animals and 
birds. (3) Preventing wrongdoing in your territory; (4) Provide for the poor. (5) 
Seek advice from spiritual practitioners recognised for their own restraint asking 
them, ‘What is wholesome and what is unwholesome? What is blameworthy 
and what blameless? What is to be practiced and what not? Doing what would 
lead to suffering and harm for me in the long run? Doing what would lead to 
happiness and benefit for me in the long run?’ and acting on that advice. (Dn. 
III.61, numbers added, translation adapted and abridged from Collins 1998, 604)
In other words, temporal authorities should not only behave in accordance 
with Dharma, but also take counsel, taking time to seek guidance on the most 
wholesome/skilful course of action from those known to behave ethically. 
While the Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta initially talks of the responsibility of 
a government, when moral order in time breaks down completely, it is 
ordinary people who are alarmed on ethical grounds at this, which leads 
them to restore order. According to B. G. Gokhale, Buddhism contributed to 
Indian political theory ‘the acceptance of a higher morality as the guiding 
spirit behind the state’ (1966, 22). This relationship between Buddhism and 
ideal governance means both that Buddhism should be very open to the idea 
of IHL rules as norms followed by majority-Buddhist states, and that we can 
find material specifically relevant to Buddhist notions of how kings should 
conduct themselves in relation to war.
The Buddha seems to have been satisfied with outlining the foundational 
principles of ethical behaviour for rulers rather than producing a set of 
explicit rules on how to behave, including in a war, which could have 
diluted the Buddha’s ideal of non-violence (Schmithausen 1999, 51). 
Nevertheless, a host of Buddhist ethical principles concerning minimising 
suffering and loss of life in armed conflict between states can be gleaned 
from the jātaka stories. Found in all Buddhist traditions, these tell of pre-
vious lifetimes of the Buddha when he as reborn as kings, ministers or 
advisors to kings, soldiers, war horses and war elephants, among others, 
whose heroism, skill and restraint in warfare enabled them to defeat the 
enemy with minimal loss of life (Jenkins 2017). Since the core stories of 
jātaka literature are set in the lifetimes before the Buddha attains enlight-
enment, they explore the world of saṃsāra, and deal with topics that are 
relevant not only to monastics, but also to lay people. They represent key 
aspects of the Buddhist ethical vision relating to complex practical realities, 
including the conduct of war, complementing the principles found in the 
sūtras and other texts. As in many cultures, complex practical realities are 
best taught through narratives such as the jātaka because they seek to 
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convey the nuance of real situations and the struggles we often face when 
weighing alternatives, handling doubts and fulfiling conflicting expecta-
tions. At the same time, the conduct of the Buddha-to-be – the bodhisattva – 
in such stories often represents a level of spiritual development far beyond 
that of ordinary people, perhaps limiting his use as our exemplar as well as 
when trying to assess contemporary conduct.
In the Asadisa Jātaka (no. 181, Jat.II.87–90), Prince Asadisa has a strong 
reputation as an effective warrior, and prevents several kings attacking the 
weaker king of Benares by warning them that he would come to his assis-
tance and defeat them if they did so. This averts a war which would have 
resulted in heavy loss of life. The jātaka concludes: ‘Thus did our Prince put to 
flight seven kings, without even shedding so much blood as a little fly might 
drink’ (Jat.II.90). In the Kusa Jātaka (no. 531, Jat.V.247–311) King Kusa, who is 
the bodhisattva, defeats seven kings who had attacked his father-in-law, King 
Madda. Although Madda then says that Kusa may kill all seven rival kings, 
Kusa instead chooses to form alliances with them through the traditional 
method of intermarriage, by arranging for them to be married to his wife’s 
sisters (Jat.V.311).
The Mahā Ummagga Jātaka (no. 546, Jat.VI.329–478)18 relates the story of 
the bodhisattva who had been reborn as Mahosadha, a wise counsellor to 
King Vedeha. Brahmadatta, a powerful neighbouring king, plans to capture 









a’s plan is first, through deception, to unite 100 weaker kings 
against Vedeha, and then poison them, to remove possible rivals. Mahosadha, 




a’s plans, and 









a is to offer 
Brahmadatta’s daughter in marriage to king Vedeha, but have him killed 
when he comes to marry her. Again, Mahosadha’s informants warn him. He 
carefully plans an ingenious strategy to save the life of King Vedeha and in the 
end frustrates the military ambitions of King Brahmadatta, doing the least 
harm to life and property. Finally, King Vedeha succeeds in obtaining 
Brahmadatta’s daughter in marriage, and the skilful and wise strategies 
adopted by Mahosadha result in the cessation of all hostilities and the 
prevention of colossal loss of life, with new bonds of friendship flourishing 
among all the kings. Although the prevention of conflict as such falls outside 
the remit of IHL (and is more a matter for the jus ad bellum), it nevertheless 
reflects a general Buddhist concern to minimise and prevent the suffering 
that arises from armed conflict.
In the jātaka stories, the bodhisattva offers explicit guidance on how to 
rule: ‘Great king, a true king . . . rules his own kingdom according to the ten 
norms of a king (dasa-rāja-dhamme), without anger, in accord with 
Dharma, even-handedly’ (Jat.III.274, Jat.V.378). Deegalle identifies the 10 
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norms then listed as ‘ten guiding principles for those in government’ 
(Deegalle 2017a, 25). They are: (i) generosity (dāna), (ii) ethical discipline 
(sīla), (iii) self-sacrifice (pariccāga), (iv) honesty and integrity (ajjava), (v) 
gentleness (maddava), (vi) self-control (tapa), (vii) non-anger (akkodha), 
(viii) non-injury (avihiṃsā), (ix) forbearing patience (khanti) and (x) ‘non- 
opposition/non-obstruction’ (avirodhana) to the wishes and welfare of the 
people.19 Several of these can be seen to promote the avoidance of war, 
humane conduct if it is waged, discontinuance of hostilities and non- 
infliction of further suffering upon the defeated by the continued use of 
military force.
A canonical text of the no longer extant Lokottaravādin school of 
Buddhism, the Mahāvastu (Mvs.I.274–277), adds some additional relevant 
guidelines for kings: to arbitrate disputes with impartiality; to admit large 
numbers of immigrants; to cultivate friendship with neighbouring kings; and 
to act justly with circumspection.
Later Buddhist texts continue to provide guidance to kings, and many of 
these are realistic about the actual use of force. Two works in the form of 
letters ascribed to the great Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna (150–250 
CE), the Ratnāvalī (‘The Precious Garland’ or Ratnamālā) and Suhṛllekhā 
(‘Letter to a Friend’), contain many valuable ethical principles for the edifica-
tion of kings. ‘The Precious Garland’, is addressed to a young ruler of the 
Sātavāhana Empire:
255. Whatever is reported by your ministers, you should find out about every-
thing by yourself. Always do everything in a way that is beneficial to the world. 
256. Just as you care to think ‘What shall I do to benefit myself?’, in the same 
way should you care about thinking what to do to benefit others. . . . 
323. As ministers, appoint people who know the social tradition and follow the 
Dharma; who are gentle, pure, faithful, and non-malicious; who are of good 
family, perfect demeanour, and are grateful (to you). 
324. As army commander, appoint someone who is magnanimous, free of 
attachment, courageous, gentle, reliable, ever-conscientious, and is a follower 
of Dharma. . . . 
327. If your governance is for the benefit of Dharma rather than for the sake of 
fame and greed, then it will be very fruitful – otherwise it will not. . . . 
329. You should gather around you many (advisors) of good family who are old 
in experience, who know the custom, abstain from evil, and who can perceive 
what must be done. (Translation by Tamas Agocs, in Harvey 2018, Chapter 4, 
v. 12)20
The first of these, to ‘find out everything by yourself’, implies that during an 
armed conflict a government should not just accept the self-justifying 
accounts of those involved in potential violations. The desired attributes of 
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the army commander outlined in the fourth verse are relevant to the qualities 
that ensure a commander and those under him conduct themselves with 
restraint.
The Ārya-satyaka-parivarta is another early Mahāyāna text which offers 
guidance to kings, emphasising that victory should only be sought to protect 
the people, and the need to minimise loss of life. Perhaps influenced by the 
edicts of emperor Ashoka (to whom we return below), the Ārya-satyaka- 
parivarta has been influential in Tibet (Asp.8, 46; 206–208).21 Similarly, the 
Humane King Sūtra (Renwang huguo banruo poluomiduo jing 仁王護國般若波 
羅蜜多經 [T8.246]), probably of Chinese origin, is recited in Chinese Buddhist 
temples even in recent history to bless the government and the country. It 
addresses rulers rather than monks or lay practitioners, giving advice on how 
to govern a state according to Buddhist principles, in peace and war, and it 
likewise highlights benevolence, patience and humaneness as key virtues for 
an ideal ruler.22
Otherwise, the example of a bad ruler is recognised as very corrosive. In 
the Aṅguttara Nikāya (An.II.74), it is recognised that when a king acts in an 
unethical (adhammika) way, this influences his ministers to do likewise, and 
this influence then spreads to brahmins and householders, and on to towns-
folk and villagers. That is, rot at the top can easily spread downwards through 
the whole of society. This is relevant to judging state actors who order, 
encourage, facilitate or condone the atrocious use of force, including during 
armed conflict.
The Buddha’s relationship with rulers
Stories of the Buddha engaging with kings who do resort to violence are found 
in the early canon. King Pasenadi, one of the Buddha’s supporters, is presented 
as a reflective person who was periodically involved in defensive wars (e.g. 
Sam.I.82–83 and 83–85). When Pasenadi is defeated by his aggressive nephew 
Ajātasattu, the Buddha says: ‘Victory breeds enmity; the defeated one sleeps 
badly. The peaceful one sleeps at ease, having abandoned victory and defeat’ 
(Sam.I.83; Dhp.201). In other words, the Buddha reflects on the unresolved 
problems of war and the advantages of having left the world of conflict 
behind. When the tables are later turned, with Pasenadi victorious, the 
Buddha says: ‘The conqueror gets a conqueror . . .. Thus by the evolution of 
karma, he who plunders is plundered’ (Sam.I.85). This does not justify violence 
even in defence, but points out that one lot of aggression can lead to another. 
Thus, aggression is discouraged and seen as having natural karmic conse-
quences, a teaching which is designed to limit such a spiral of vengeance.
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The war between Pasenadi and Ajātasattu continues because Pasenadi 
seeks to be punitive towards those he has defeated by confiscating his 
enemy’s army.23 Khantipalo comments:
The Buddha saw how fruitless would be Pasenadi’s action in confiscating the 
army of his troublesome nephew. The effect that it had was to harden 
Ajātasattu’s resolve to conquer Kosala. In our times the huge reparations 
demanded of Germany after the First World War is another good example – 
our revenge is followed by their revenge as seen in Hitler and the Second World 
War. (Khantipalo 1986, 14)
Unless there is a reconciliatory attitude in a post-war situation, the Buddha 
shows that enmity of the defeated grows, creating the potential for further 
conflicts. This might have implications for how Buddhism would suggest IHL 
violations are avoided and dealt with – and for its relationship to jus post 
bellum more generally.
Elizabeth Harris detects an ambivalence in the story of the Buddha’s inter-
action with Pasenadi (1994, 18). The Buddha never directly criticises Pasenadi 
for his involvement in warfare, just as he is not critical of the deity Sakka, who 
rules the good deities in their conflict with the evil asura demi-gods. He even 
describes Pasenadi as a ‘friend and companion to those who are good 
(kalyāṇa)’ after Pasenadi has engaged in defensive fighting. Overall, Pasenadi 
is presented as a conflicted king, one who seeks to do what is right but is 
caught up in the duties of kingship and the realities of conflict. This dilemma is 
reflected elsewhere in the Pali Canon, with the Buddha wondering if it is 
possible to be a king who ‘reigns according to dhamma [justice, virtue, right-
eousness], without killing or causing to kill, without conquering or causing to 
conquer, without grieving or causing to grieve’ (Rajja Sutta, Sam.I.116–117).
Though the Rajja Sutta may be taken as indicating the Buddha’s misgivings 
about the pitfalls of temporal power, since he then rejects the suggestion by 
Māra that he could remain in saṃsāra to be just such a just and righteous 
king, the necessity of kingship or strong governance is reflected in the myth 
of the first king, found in the Aggañña Sutta, ‘The Discourse on Origins’ (Dn. 
III.80–98). There, after problems arising from inequalities and greed descend 
into violence, the people elect the most virtuous member of society to be 
king in order to restore and maintain law and order. Overall, while repeatedly 
valorising the path of the renouncer, the Buddha accommodates the realities 
of the duties of kings and their subjects. Relatedly, he recognised that soldiers 
were obliged to serve the state and were not free to desert, so he made it 
a rule that a soldier could not ordain as a Buddhist monk without first getting 
a discharge from his military duties (Vin.I.73–74).
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Historical exemplars of Buddhist rulership
The Emperor Ashoka (Pali Asoka, Sanskrit Aśoka) of the Mauryan dynasty, who 
ruled much of South Asia in the middle of the third century BCE, is the most 
important historical exemplar of the ideal Buddhist king. What makes Ashoka 
stand out from other royals is his robust transformation after his regret of the 
horrors of war, and the policies he subsequently implemented that might have 
generated far-reaching benefits to all those within his sphere of influence, not 
confined to a specific group. Both the inscriptions he left behind and Buddhist 
narratives handed down over the centuries identify him as being an important 
patron of Buddhism, while being supportive of other religious traditions, and 
turning his back on violence. In particular, one of his inscriptions describes his 
regret at the huge death toll of 100,000 casualties and other suffering caused by 
his war of expansion in the Kaliṅga region (modern Orissa in eastern India, Nikam 
and McKeon 1959, 27–30). He then determines to rule by Dharma rather than 
violence and sends missionaries of Dharma to neighbouring regions.
As such, he was not only perhaps the most striking example in recorded history 
of a ruler abandoning war, but largely responsible for the propagation of 
Buddhism across Asia (Gombrich 2015). The Samantapāsādikā, a fifth-century 
commentary on the vinaya, describes Ashoka’s horrified regret when a minister, 
whom he had sent to sort out problems within the Sangha, becomes punitively 
violent, executing some of the monks (Gethin 2012, 24–25). The narration pro-
vides a protocol for the involvement of rulers in the Sangha: they can help purify 
the Sangha, send out missions and offer sponsorship, but violence, even to monks 
ejected from the Sangha for wrongdoing, is inappropriate.24 Ashoka did not 
renounce violence entirely, and maintained a standing army following his con-
version, presumably for defensive purposes, warning recalcitrant hill-tribes that 
he retained ‘the power to punish, despite his repentance [for those killed in battle] 
in order to induce them to desist from their crimes and escape execution’ (Florida 
2013, 335). While some of Ashoka’s policies and post-war rhetoric may have been 
judicious statecraft to pacify subjected peoples, nevertheless, the cakravartin role 
model as enacted by Ashoka after his conversion remains the ideal in Buddhism 
to this day.
Historically, although Buddhist ideals have often influenced kings in Buddhist 
countries, there have been notable examples where this has particularly been the 
case. King Sirisanngabō (Pali Siri Saṅghabodhi) of Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka, who 
reigned around 247–249 CE, is a case in point, following the precepts and 
epitomising the principle of non-violence in his personal life and statecraft, 
refusing to execute criminals or use force against rebels. Forced into exile in the 
forest when the opposition from a close contender became unendurable, he 
eventually made the ultimate sacrifice, severing his own head to give to his fierce 
opponent (Mvm.36.73–97; Deegalle 2014, 581–583, 2017a, 42–46). A different 
example of virtuous statecraft comes from Thailand in the form of King Naresuan 
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(r. 1590–1605). Victorious despite betrayal by his generals on the battlefield 
during a Burmese attack on Ayutthaya, he consulted the chief monk as regards 
their punishment. The monk advised, ‘[T]hese events occurred merely to make 
manifest the miraculous nature of my Lord’s honour’, and King Naresuan demon-
strated his adherence to Buddhist teachings by forgiving them (Deegalle 2014, 
586–588). These are certainly not the only examples of kings following Buddhist 
ideals and implementing them in the statecraft. The difficulties encountered by 
King Sirisanngabō in implementing non-violent and caring policies in his state-
craft raise important questions of whether it is an unrealistic way to govern or, 
rather, if it offers a confirmation that violence and conflict can emerge in any 
society at any time when individuals are not fully committed to the noble 
principles of non-violence.25
Being a Buddhist and a combatant
Whereas IHL does not opine on the ethics of being a combatant except as 
needed for compliance with the law, Buddhist texts do consider this matter. 
In the Yodhājīva Sutta, a warrior, literally one who fights for a living 
(yodhājīva) – the text does not differentiate between a professional soldier 
and a mercenary – asks the Buddha whether he will go to heaven if he dies in 
battle. His questions reflect an idea found in some Hindu texts that there is 
a special heaven for warriors who die in battle. Reluctantly, the Buddha 
explains that such a person is actually reborn in a hell or as an animal, insofar 
as he dies with his mind in a misdirected state, wishing the death of others:
Yodhājīva the Mercenary[/warrior] approached the Blessed One, paid homage 
to him . . . and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, I have heard it said . . . “When 
a mercenary [warrior] is one who strives and exerts himself in battle, if others 
slay and finish him off while he is striving and exerting himself in battle, then 
with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of the 
battle-slain devas [gods]”. What does the Blessed One say about that?’ . . . 
‘Surely, headman, I am not getting through to you when I say, “Enough, head-
man, let it be! Don’t ask me that!” But still, I will answer you. When, headman, 
a mercenary [warrior] is one who strives and exerts himself in battle, his mind is 
already low, depraved, misdirected by the thought: “Let these beings be slain, 
slaughtered, annihilated, destroyed, exterminated”. If others then slay and finish 
him off while he is striving and exerting himself in battle, then with the breakup 
of the body, after death, he is reborn in the battle-slain hell. . . . [And for a person 
who holds the wrong view that they go to heaven], there is one of two 
destinations: either hell or the animal realm’. (Sam.IV.308–309; Bodhi 2003, 
1334–1335)
The Buddha says the same when questioned by an elephant warrior 
(hatthāroha) and a cavalry warrior (assāroha) (Sam.IV.310). The question 
is not about his state of mind when dying. Wilfully killing someone is – 
according to the detailed analysis of psychological causality provided by 
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Buddhist Abhidhamma – always the result of unwholesome/unskilful 
intentions rooted in hatred and/or delusion. It can never be the result 
of purely wholesome intention (Gethin 2004, 175). It is for this reason 
that, even if killing is motivated by a desire for a better overall out-
come, or altruistic reasons, it cannot, according to early Buddhism, be 
carried out without some negative karmic consequences. As we saw 
when examining the later concept of upāya, or skill-in-means, in the 
Mahāyāna text the Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra, even the advanced bodhisattva 
must accept the possibility of hellish consequences for his altruistic act 
of killing – this acceptance itself being the cause, in such narratives, of 
the altruistic killer avoiding hell. The consistency of these teachings 
undermines recent attempts to reinterpret the Yodhājīva Sutta as 
being about the overall motivation behind the killing rather than the 
act itself.26 For Abhidhamma, killing always proceeds from unskilful 
intention. That said, it makes sense that motivation and specific inten-
tion when killing in battle will affect the intensity and duration of 
a consequent bad rebirth.
The influential fourth-century scholar-monk Vasubandhu indicates that the 
responsibility for killing is shared by all the soldiers in an army (Akb.IV.72c–d). 
When one person orders another person to do something, Buddhism is clear 
that both the orderer and the ordered are responsible for the action, and one 
may be reborn in hell for a wrong committed even at the king’s behest (Mn. 
II.188; Harvey 1999, 280). Of the two, of course, the orderer has the greater 
responsibility. The ordered, though, has a responsibility not to obey immoral (or 
illegal) orders. This is absolutely in line with IHL’s emphasis on the individual 
soldier’s responsibility to disobey illegal orders, for example to kill civilians.
This conflict between obeying orders to attack the enemy and the karmic 
consequences of breaking of the first precept is a major preoccupation of 
Buddhist combatants. Sunil Kariyakarawana (2011, 7), the Buddhist chaplain 
to HM Forces in the UK, quotes a Buddhist who is a lieutenant colonel in the 
British Army:
What we cannot have in the military is a situation where our soldiers/officers 
hesitate on the battlefield . . .. Of course, I am not suggesting that we blindly 
follow orders if those orders are illegal, but then all soldiers are taught this in 
any case. If an order is illegal then it is a different thing. So, in my opinion, this is 
why I personally frequently contemplate my position. 
- Do I trust that my Government are correctly motivated in their considerations
over the use of their Armed Forces?
- Does our Army still function in as humanitarian manner as possible?
- Do I think that we are still acting as a force for good in what we are doing?
If I can truthfully answer ‘yes’ to all these then I am content that I can remain in 
this profession, but it is a personal decision . . .. If I have doubts over any of these 
questions then I would have to leave. 
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But one thing is for sure: if I have remained in the Army and the time comes for 
me to carry out or give an order that involved taking life, then I must do so, but 
in full mindfulness about that decision, and with full cognisance as to the karmic 
consequences. But I must not hesitate. The decision about my profession must 
be made before I am in that situation. On the battlefield is not the time to make 
such considerations.27
Of course, the role of a soldier involves many kinds of tasks, including peace-
keeping duties, providing help during civil emergencies, and offering protec-
tion through deterrence. The shared responsibility also implies that when an 
army performs a good action such as protecting people or helping in 
a humanitarian emergency, then all members of it share in some of the 
good karma of this. A member of an army, then, has a stake in that army 
acting in as moral a way as possible. Yet, sooner or later, it is likely to be 
involved in maiming or killing people, or supporting others who do this. From 
a Buddhist perspective, killing or harming always produces negative karma, 
while some Mahāyāna texts offer the extremely rare exception, discussed 
above, of the highly advanced bodhisattva.
In practice, we see the engagement of Buddhists, even of monks, in 
military action, and there are parallels between monastic and military dis-
cipline. For centuries, martial arts (discussed in more detail below) have 
been on the curriculum of monasteries in several parts of the Buddhist 
world, most famously at the Shaolin temple in China. While the skills of 
Shaolin warrior monks were put to use in military campaigns of Chinese 
rulers, their explicit purpose was in part self-protection and in part the 
protection of others, an example of the latter being their famous defence 
in the sixteenth century of coastal peoples from attack by Japanese pirates. 
Nonetheless, in the history of East Asia, we even find examples of Buddhist 
monks turning into mercenaries. For instance, in medieval Japan, the Sōhei 
were warrior monks who protected their temples from other Buddhist 
schools, but they also became mercenaries hired to defend the property 
of aristocratic families (Adolphson 2007).
In the modern period both Chinese and Japanese monks and ex-monks 
served in the army, with both sides claiming to protect the true Dharma 
against the other (Victoria 1997, 2003). The adaptation of earlier teachings to 
address the tension of being a monk and soldier during this time is high-
lighted in the following interview from the autobiography of the Chinese 
monk Zhenhua (Chen Hua 真華 1922–2012):
‘What happens to your compassion if we go into battle? Would you fire your 
rifle at the enemy?’ 
‘I would’, I answered without a moment’s hesitation. 
‘Doesn’t that run counter to your idea of compassion?’ 
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‘A soldier is duty-bound to kill the enemy in order to protect his country. Since 
I am a soldier, that is my duty too. At the same time, killing one man in order to 
save one hundred is, in Mahayana Buddhism, an act of expedient mercy. If we 
kill a small number of evil men to save a large number of good men, we are not 
acting contrary to compassion’, I replied. (Hua 1992, 210)
Zhenhua’s response clearly references the Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra, which we 
examined above, in which the bodhisattva saves the lives of 500 by killing 
one. Zhenhua is therefore implicitly claiming the status of an advanced 
bodhisattva.
The living practice, then, has shown some variation from the prescriptions 
and ideal found in early Buddhist texts; these developments were results of 
local processes of textual and doctrinal interpretations under specific social 
and political pressures. While looking back at past events and rhetoric allows 
us to see such statements within a political context and historical moment, 
the realities of the lived present will often raise the necessity of making 
morally significant decisions that may run counter to such ideals. As 
Bhikkhu Bodhi writes,
[T]he complexity of the human condition inevitably presents us with circum-
stances where moral obligations run at crosscurrents. In such cases, I believe, we 
must simply do our best to navigate between them, rigorously examining our 
own motives and aspiring to reduce harm and suffering for the greatest number 
of those at risk. (Bodhi 2014).
This means that despite the ideal of non-violence, there is a need to accept 
the reality of violence in order to apply principles that reduce suffering within 
combat situations.
The values of Buddhist combatants
Throughout history one can find armies and non-state armed groups in 
Buddhist-dominated countries and regions, with large percentages of com-
batants identifying as Buddhist. There are also Buddhist members of militaries 
in other parts of the world. Given that some of the qualities of an ideal soldier, 
who seeks to protect others even to the point of self-sacrifice, and the 
perfections to be realised by a bodhisattva show some overlap (see below), 
becoming a soldier may be attractive to a deeply committed Buddhist, even 
for armies not formed through conscription.
The relationship between the army and the Sangha varies, but where 
Buddhism is part of national identity, it can be close. In Thailand, for example, 
army officers are integrated into all of levels of Thai society, having access to 
higher echelons of the Sangha. All men of eligible age who are not monks 
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either volunteer or are required to enter the lottery for national service, 
resulting in conscription periods of six months to two years, with the shorter 
times being allocated to those who volunteer or have higher education.28
While military service is not compulsory in Sri Lanka, high-profile monks 
often opine on matters that involve the military, and there is a Buddhist 
temple in Panagoda that is maintained by the Sri Lankan Army. Monks living 
close to army barracks as well as popular preachers who live elsewhere are 
often invited to deliver sermons to soldiers on special days of celebration 
such as Vesak and anniversary days of the military. Daniel Kent has analysed 
the sermons given to soldiers on such occasions (2010). The monks do not 
justify killing, and mostly do not say that there is no bad karma in a soldier’s 
killing someone – which they are often asked about by soldiers. Rather, they
● Counsel that the intention (cetanā) of killing is to be set beside the 
intention of protecting one’s comrades, the nation, and Buddhism (see 
also King 2013, 646–647). Only a minority of monks see this as negating 
the evil involved in killing (Kent 2010, 165), but it is seen by most to help 
minimise it, and for a soldier, their primary duty relates to these concerns 
(Kent 2010, 162; see also Bartholomeusz 1999, 2002).
● Guide the soldiers on how to stay calm and avoid anger even in battle. 
This is to avoid the adverse outcomes of panic and anger, which can 
include becoming more violent than they need to be, or indiscriminately 
violent; that is, their use of violence should be minimised and regulated 
(see also King 2013, 647–648). Innocent civilians should not be killed, nor 
animals (Kent 2010, 172), and soldiers should not act out of revenge.
● Teach that being mindful of actions and the situation will also help.
● Encourage the doing of positive acts (good karma) that will generate 
merit, seen by Buddhism to help dilute the demerit generated by the 
bad karma of killing, and to share this merit with the dead.
Though Kent does not expand on this in terms of potential applications, they 
all have the potential to heighten restraint and thus enhance compliance 
with IHL by ensuring, for example, that the intention is to protect non- 
combatants as far as possible. Undertaking compensatory positive acts 
could include helping, or at least not preventing, medical and other huma-
nitarian aid getting through or allowing the ‘enemy’ to reclaim their dead and 
perform their last rites.29
The sermons recorded by Kent identify a number of qualities valued in 
Buddhism that can also be of benefit to combatants. Other such qualities are 
compassion and concern for those without protection, generosity of spirit 
and helpfulness. Self-sacrifice or renunciation (tyāga) and energy or persever-
ance (Sanskrit vīrya, Pali viriya), a term which is related to ‘virility’ and hence 
manliness and courage, are two of the ‘perfections’ developed by the 
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bodhisattva shared with the values of an ideal soldier. Viriya is also included in 
another set of qualities fostered by Buddhism, known as the ‘five faculties’, 
the other four being faithful trust in the three refuges, more broadly in the 
value of moral actions, and trust in good people; mindfulness; calm concen-
tration; and wisdom. Of these qualities, those of energetic mental strength 
and calm concentration are particularly helpful to members of the armed 
forces. These two qualities, though, are seen in Buddhist psychology as 
ethically variable. For example, suicide bombers probably need courageous 
mental strength, and bank robbers may need good concentration. What 
makes such qualities good ones, according to Buddhism, is their association 
with faith, mindfulness and wisdom, so that they are rightly guided and 
applied. One could say that the goal must be right, wisdom must guide 
how it is approached, and the quality of mindfulness is crucial. This includes 
aspects of alert attentiveness and situational awareness that are crucial for 
combatants to behave ethically in the heat of battle.
In Buddhism, while killing in anger is bad, so too is killing in a calm and 
concentrated way, without compunction, as might perhaps be done by 
a sniper, or the controller of a drone weapons platform. At the moment 
when such a person kills, Buddhism would regard them as being in a state 
of wrong concentration, without a mindful connection to Dharma values. 
That said, their actions also require being carefully mindful of who not to kill. 
This aspect can be seen as in line with Dharma values. Here, then, it is the 
ethical basis that ensures that a combatant’s actions are in accordance with 
the IHL principles that regulate the conduct of hostilities: distinction, propor-
tionality and precaution.
Buddhism values and seeks to cultivate determination, patience, non- 
anger, self-control and equanimity. Self-discipline is important, as shown for 
example in right effort, aimed at overcoming greed, hatred and delusion and 
cultivating their opposites. Here there may well be some overlap with the 
discipline that is cultivated in the military. Both include living by values and 
rules; Buddhist monks, for example, follow over 200 disciplinary rules. Both 
include an emphasis on patiently enduring difficult things, and not giving 
way to surges of emotion. Sometimes, the struggles of a monk against 
temptations are likened to the struggle of a soldier in battle (An.III.89–93), 
and the Buddha advises King Pasenadi that, just as the best person for him to 
employ as a soldier is one who is well trained, experienced and courageous, 
so it is best to give alms to those monastics who are truly virtuous (Sam.I.98– 
99). That said, while some of the rules of the military are clearly at odds with 
some Buddhist ones, Buddhist values may be drawn on to enhance and 
improve military culture in order to reduce suffering for combatants and 
others caught up in conflict.
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According to IHL, all feasible precautions must be taken by parties to 
conflict to avoid or minimise as far as possible harm to non-combatants 
and civilian objects. Just as some aspects of military training are about 
precaution in the use of force and handling of weapons, so the rules of 
monastic discipline, the vinaya, emphasise deportment, conscious and cau-
tious conduct, and full awareness of one’s intended course of action before 
commencing on that course of action. Minor rules of decorum and care 
contribute to an overall mental state of habitual precaution.
Enhancing habitual precaution in Buddhism are two attitudes advocated 
for all Buddhists, which are regarded as highly useful in avoiding misconduct. 
The two are hiri, appropriate shame for wrongdoing, and ottappa, remorse 
over the consequences of wrongdoing. Bhikkhu Bodhi explores these two 
qualities in an article entitled ‘The Guardians of the World’ (1993). He writes:
Hiri is an innate sense of shame over moral transgression; ottappa is moral 
dread, fear of the results of wrongdoing. The Buddha calls these two states the 
bright guardians of the world (sukka lokapāla). He gives them this designation 
because as long as these two states prevail in people’s hearts the moral 
standards of the world remain intact, while when their influence wanes the 
human world falls into unabashed promiscuity and violence . . . (Itiv. 42). Hiri, the 
sense of shame, has an internal reference; it is rooted in self-respect and induces 
us to shrink from wrongdoing out of a feeling of personal honor. Ottappa, fear 
of wrongdoing, has an external orientation. It is the voice of conscience that 
warns us of the dire consequences of moral transgression: blame and punish-
ment by others, the painful kammic results of evil deeds, the impediment to our 
desire for liberation from suffering. Acariya Buddhaghosa illustrates the differ-
ence between the two with the simile of an iron rod smeared with excrement at 
one end and heated to a glow at the other end: hiri is like one’s disgust at 
grabbing the rod in the place where it is smeared with excrement, ottappa is 
like one’s fear of grabbing it in the place where it is red hot.
Buddhist texts such as the Bodhicatyāvatāra recommend always acting as if in 
the presence of the Buddhas, so that one constantly feels that one must 
behave at one’s best. This attitude alerts one to potential errors, also during 
armed conflict.
Another useful quality advocated in Buddhism and pertinent to ensuring 
optimal conduct is khanti/ks
_
ānti, forbearance. There are three types of ks
_
ānti: 
acceptance of suffering, forbearance as a result of reflection upon the teach-
ing, and tolerance of the injurious behaviour of others (Crosby and Skilton 
1995, 45). The Lokavipatti Sutta (An.IV.157, cf. Dn.III.260, 286) describes how 
everyone is subject to the eight worldly conditions (loka-dhamma), namely 
gain and loss (lābha and alābha); fame/good repute/popularity and disre-
pute/shame/obscurity (yasa and ayasa); blame and praise (nindā and 
pasaṃsā); pleasure and pain (sukha and dukkha). Recognising these four 
pairs of agreeable and disagreeable experiences as impermanent, painful, 
and subject to change encourages patience and equanimity rather than 
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allowing oneself to be captured by an emotional reaction. Drawing on 
the second type of ks
_
ānti, this supports the first type, acceptance of suffering. 
Relevant to the third type, tolerance of injurious behaviour, which is impor-
tant in relation to non-retaliation, is Dhammapada v. 320, ‘As an elephant in 
the battlefield withstands arrows shot from bows all around, even so shall 
I endure abuse. There are many, indeed, who lack virtue’ (Translation 
Buddharakkhita 1985).
That said, clear discernment and acknowledgement of the truth of things 
as they really are does not necessarily mean inaction. The Ārya-satyaka- 
parivarta cautions against indulgence of wrongdoing on the part of a ruler 
because it leads to lawlessness (Asp 228, cited Harvey 2000, 347). This raises 
the question of whether passive responses to abusive situations are always 
a valid Buddhist response or a misinterpretation. Letting others get away with 
bad behaviour is in any case bad for them, so resistance may be appropriate, 
if proportionate and without anger, so as not to escalate a conflict. Clearly, in 
a battle situation, letting anger get the better of one is what can lead to IHL 
abuses.
Dhammapada vv. 3–6 says:
‘He abused me, he struck me, he defeated me, he robbed me’. For those who 
brood like this, hatred is not stilled. 
‘He abused me, he struck me, he defeated me, he robbed me’. For those who 
don’t brood like this, hatred is stilled. 
In this world, hatred is never ended by hatred, but only by the opposite of 
hatred. This has always been so. 
And others do not know that we come to an end here; but those who know, 
thereby their quarrels are allayed. (Translation Peter Harvey)
Such ideas are in tune with IHL. One IHL violation, such as killing of civilians, 
does not justify reprisals against civilians from the opposing community, and, 
indeed, such retributive action can cause both sides to slide into an intract-
able cycle of atrocities.
Buddhist psychological resources
Buddhism’s remarkable psychological resources can enhance the perfor-
mance of combatants in ways that ensure greater compliance with IHL. 
A lack of comprehension of the battlespace in the fog of war can make acting 
with precaution and restraint exceedingly difficult. Throughout its history, 
Buddhism has encouraged the development of expertise in meditation as 
a mental technology that promotes positive psychological change. Indeed, 
the practice might be beneficial in ensuring that the highest values of 
Buddhism and IHL are followed during armed conflict.
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Modern psychology and neuroscience studies have shown that different 
types of meditation can enhance different mental skills (Braboszcz, 
Hahusseau, and Delorme 2010), and meditation practices have even been 
shown to support the development of specific qualities that are directly 
relevant to soldiers who must attain their military objectives while also 
minimising the infliction of suffering and preventing IHL violations in high- 
stress combat situations. These include situational awareness, working mem-
ory capacity, emotional face processing, attentional control and dealing with 
complexity.30 The development of these qualities, in turn, allows combatants 
to maintain and process information better, and to keep focus and react 
appropriately to the environment, discriminating between targets and non- 
targets, which in turn can reduce collateral damage. Therefore, certain med-
itation practices from Buddhism may improve compliance with IHL as 
a matter of course by making combatants better able to uphold the law’s 
targeting rules, notably those that relate to taking feasible precautions in 
attack.
Meditation may also lead to more prosocial behaviour, as well as better 
awareness of one’s own motivations and constructed identity. These in turn 
may help reduce retaliatory behaviour or compliance with peer pressure. The 
effect of meditation on practitioners’ awareness of and responsiveness to 
stress is of advantage to the soldier’s well-being. It also makes acting appro-
priately and in proportion more likely, allowing combatants to adjust their 
responses to the actual level of threat in a given situation, in part making sure 
the nervous system is not stuck in stress modes with high cortisol and 
adrenalin levels when such flight and fight responses are not needed. It 
could also reduce maladaptive coping mechanisms such as gratuitous vio-
lence and the use of intoxicants.31
Buddhist meditative practices may also be of help for veterans who are 
physically and/or mentally damaged by their time in conflict. Former soldiers 
may suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to what they did or 
experienced during war, even if this was in accord with IHL.32 Buddhist 
meditation, whether entailing primarily mindfulness of mental states or 
somatic, body-based, practices, may help one to calm the agitation that 
comes from past bad memories. Buddhist confession rituals used in East 
Asia are found to be particularly helpful in dealing with the past. This ties in 
with the understanding that those who do not recognise and regret past 
failings are likely to karmically suffer from them to a greater degree in the 
long run, especially rebirth-wise.
Abhidhamma literature analyses karmic causality further, including by 
looking at the conditioning forces (paccaya) that link the causal relationship 





the seventh book of the Theravādin Abhidhamma Pit
_
aka (the third section of 
the Pali Canon), focuses on the workings of causality. One of the conditioning 
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hāna is called āsevana-paccaya or ‘repetition condition’, 
which causes the effects (conditioned states) to gain more and more profi-
ciency, so that succeeding states come to possess greater proficiency and 
strength (Kyaw 2014, 197) to the extent that one’s repeated intentional 
actions can transform into ingrained habits.
The factor of āsevana could contribute to the ways in which people can 
become inured to violence and its effects. Once a soldier or civilian gets used 
to killing or witnessing violence, this might influence how they relate to 
others either in the conflict zone or in the wider community in regular life, 
and affect their decision-making or respect for concerns and values that 
guarantee life and security. This applies both to individuals deployed or 
caught up in these situations and to those in authority, who become inured 
to decision-making that brings others into harm’s way. This could then 
contribute to careless or disproportionate action during or after an armed 
conflict situation.
These factors underscore how consideration should also be given to how 
much psychological damage is caused to soldiers as a result of deployment in 
war zones and how this might perhaps be minimised by preventing the worst 
excesses of war. Transgressing the restraining line of not killing – the first 
precept for Buddhists – also perhaps entails the danger that such a person 
might more readily abandon other humanitarian principles, such as those in 
IHL or encoded in Buddhist precepts, which might otherwise restrain their 
behaviour. This could cause them to lose sight of the highly valued Buddhist 
aspiration to provide protection for those without a protector (Bca.3, v. 17, 
Crosby and Skilton 1995, 21). Dehumanising military training designed to 
override the individual’s aversion to killing and increase their rate of fire is 
also a likely contributing factor to the psychological distress and the epidemic 
of PTSD among some more advanced militaries (French and Jack 2015, 
174–179).
Dehumanising involves projecting negative emotions onto the enemy, 
and has been recognised as a significant factor in breaches of IHL such as 
the retaliation and atrocities that may attend warfare. French and Jack 
propose that the less emotional process of objectifying the enemy may 
be a lesser evil in that it may disengage emotional responses to enable the 
combatant to fight, including to kill, efficiently, without the unstoppable 
disadvantages of the heightened negative emotions of dehumanising. 
French and Jack liken such military objectification to the way in which 
a surgeon must switch off the potentially debilitating emotional response 
to performing a dangerous yet life-saving operation in order to objectify the 
patient as a biological organism in need of fixing (French and Jack 2015, 
185–187). While this would suggest that meditation to develop empathy for 
the enemy, rather than objectifying them, could be counterproductive from 
the perspective of the soldier’s physical survival, the project to objectify 
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finds some common ground with Buddhist meditations on emptiness or on 
no-self, seeing the enemy and oneself not so much as individuals but rather 
as processes lacking any inherent self. We should also bear in mind the 
possible danger of misapplications of this idea, where the enemy is seen as 
‘empty’, but the emptiness of oneself and one’s own side is overlooked 
(Harvey 2000, 267–268). Awareness that multiple conditions bring about 
any given situation and construct one’s apparent individuality is important 
in reducing anger-based responses, including acts of revenge. In the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra chapter on ks
_
ānti (forbearance or patience), one is advised 
to look at all the broader causal conditions influencing the actions of others 
before reacting with or escalating anger (Bca.6, 37–43; Crosby and Skilton 
1995, 53–54). A process of objectification in training, that also draws on 
these Buddhist insights, might allow combatants to engage in battle while 
minimising further killing and damage to the enemy, while also avoiding 
PTSD for themselves.





about multiple conditions influencing any given outcome, and the perspec-
tive of the Mahāyāna concept of emptiness, may offer insights in relation to 
understanding behaviour and determining not just how to act in armed 
conflict situations, but how to set up the conditions to limit adverse out-
comes. They may provide more dynamic ways, or highlight that there are 
more options, to stop a negative outcome or facilitate a positive one, and in 
particular to have a broader perspective that inhibits IHL violations.
Buddhism and martial arts
Several Buddhist traditions incorporated martial arts into the training pro-
vided at monasteries. Martial arts is a broad term covering a variety of 
codified traditions that originated as methods of combat and incorporate 
certain mental or spiritual qualities. At its core, it is about the skilful control of 
physical force. Warriors who practised martial arts took an acute interest in 
the relevance of their religion and how to apply it to their work. They required 
a sense of purpose, a moral code and a readiness to die in battle in service of 
their master or purpose, and so a way to face death. It is unsurprising, then, 
that the realms of Buddhism, martial arts and combat became intimately 
intertwined. Monastic fighting forces often emerged when armed conflicts 
were on the rise and members of the Sangha perceived the need to take up 
arms against invading forces, pirates, bandits, hostile sects and sometimes 
even the state. While this mostly occurred in the Mahāyāna contexts of China, 
Japan, Korea and Tibet, there are also examples from Southeast Asian 
Theravāda countries.33
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The connection to the martial arts is particularly pronounced in the Chan 
(Zen/Seon/Thien) school. For centuries of its turbulent history, China’s most 
emblematic Chan monastery, Shaolin, was a hub of military innovation and 
famed for the skill of its warrior monks, with many military practitioners 
visiting them to further their knowledge. The monastery evolved into an 
important institution for collecting, refining and transmitting martial arts. 
Strikingly, it was particularly famous for its staff techniques, a weapon that 
when used for protecting oneself characteristically minimised harm caused to 
the attacker (Lorge 2011).
In Japan, Zen came to be known as the ‘religion of the warrior’ and 
emerged as a crucial element in the development of its martial arts. On 
a very pragmatic level, by eliminating fear and focusing the mind to the 
present moment, the samurai warrior class realised that practising Zen made 
them better fighters. There was considerable exchange between the two 
spheres, and many samurai became Zen monks in later life, such as Suzuki 
Shōsan (1579–1655 CE) whose Dharma teachings were filled with martial 
images. It was also a Zen monk (Takuan Sōhō) who authored what is possibly 
the most influential treatise on Buddhist philosophy and martial arts, The 
Unfettered Mind (Soho 2012).
Buddhism and traditional martial arts both adhere to high ethical 
principles and strive to minimise suffering. Martial arts is the art of learn-
ing to control and restrain strong physical force. Through continuous 
training one develops the ability to use sophisticated techniques to 
avoid harm, using only the amount of physical force needed to refuse 
the violence that one is being offered. Training the mind and mastering 
one’s breath are as important as training the body. Complex patterns of 
movements, so characteristic of martial arts, are considered forms of 
moving meditation (Mann 2012). Meditation techniques foster the mind-
fulness that permits one to maintain clarity in battle. By overcoming 
attachment, including the attachment to one’s own life, and by develop-
ing confidence in the ability to defend oneself, one learns to better 
control one’s fear and mental dispositions. This in turn reduces the risk 
of fear-based aggression, inflicting greater harm to the attacker than is 
ethically or legally justifiable.
Research studies consistently show that, like meditation, martial arts help 
practitioners to better gain a sense of control over both the situational 
environment and themselves, leading to fewer negative emotional responses 
and an overall reduction in violent behaviour (see e.g. Harwood, Lavidor, and 
Rassovsky 2017). Notably, both martial arts and Buddhist meditation techni-
ques are being applied by more and more militaries and law enforcement 
agencies around the world. Their training regimes could probably also benefit 
from martial arts’ emphasis on character-building principles such as disci-
pline, humility and respect. Buddhism’s historic links with martial arts, and the 
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effectiveness of the latter in containing violence and harm within a combat 
situation, indicate a rich vein of practical resources within Buddhism that 
could enhance compliance with IHL as well as codes that might enhance the 
formulation of IHL itself.
Attitude to weapons
IHL aims to regulate rather than ban the arms industry per se. It variously 
prohibits the use, stockpiling and transfer of weapons, such as chemical and 
biological weapons and landmines, which cause unnecessary, indiscriminate 
and/or prolonged human suffering relative to the accomplishment of military 
objectives. Moreover, the UN Arms Trade Treaty restricts the transfer of 
otherwise legal weapons from one country to another if there is a risk they 
might be used to commit violations of IHL (UN 2013, 2018). Warfare is now 
often based on expensive, high-tech weapons that require a high level of 
funding by the parties involved. According to Buddhism, trading in weapons 
is one of the five ‘wrong livelihoods’, and therefore raises some serious 
questions about the arms industry (An.III.208). Storing weapons is identified 
as against the secondary precepts of a bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna 
Brahmajāla Sūtra: ‘A disciple of the Buddha should not store weapons such 
as knives, clubs, bows, arrows, spears, axes or any other weapons, nor may he 
keep nets, traps or any such devices used in destroying life’ (Buddhist Text 
Translation Society 1981). Again, in reality, countries and groups with 
a significant Buddhist majority do buy, trade in and store weapons, making 
the application of IHL and Buddhist principles to limit the use of weapons 
relevant.
Treatment of prisoners
The warning against harming the unarmed in Dhammapada v. 137 surely 
includes prisoners.34 Furthermore, jātaka stories specifically indicate that 
a defeated enemy is to be well treated. In one of the jātaka stories (no. 23, 
Bhojājānīya-jātaka, Jat.I.178–81), a horse instrumental in winning a war for its 
master advises the latter not to kill his enemies – seven rulers who had been 
brought to him as captives – but to spare them. As exemplified in such 
instances, the Buddhist position is that victors in wars should be magnani-
mous towards vanquished enemies under their control.
Another example of such forbearance is provided in a Buddhist story about 
the gods and the power-hungry demi-gods (asuras) (Sam.I.220–222). 
Vepacitti, the defeated demi-god leader, is brought before Sakka, leader of 
a group of gods and a follower of the Buddha. When Vepacitti curses him, 
Sakka’s lack of reaction is misunderstood by his charioteer as fear or weakness 
(Premasiri 2006, 84–85; Deegalle 2014, 558–564). Sakka explains it is neither:
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It is really worse for him who responds in anger to one who is angered. One who 
does not show anger towards the angered wins a battle that is difficult to win. 
He who, having known that the other person has been angered, mindfully 
keeps his calm, conducts himself for the well-being of both himself and the 
other. (Sam.I.222, and Vism.324)
Similarly, as noted above, Dhammapada v. 137 says that ‘He who inflicts 
violence on those who are unarmed’ will experience much suffering as 
a karmic result, implying that violence towards the defenceless is particularly 
bad. Prisoners of war and detainees of all kinds are of course particularly 
vulnerable given that they are in the power of opposing forces, and Buddhist 
ideas on how to treat prisoners in general, whether in times of war or peace, 
are also relevant.35
The Sumaṅgala Jātaka (no. 420) says that a king should not impose 
punishment on offenders when he is emotionally disturbed. Such action is 
likely to result in unethical excesses. The ethical policy adopted by a king is 
well illustrated when the king considers: ‘If excessively angry, the lord should 
not prescribe punishment unfairly and in an unbefitting manner, heaping 
many sufferings upon another’ (Jat.III.441).
The Precious Garland of the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (see above) 
advises a king that criminals should be treated thus:
330. Never resort to executing, binding, and torturing (criminals) even if they 
deserve it. Filled with compassion, always take them under your care. . . . 
333. Release those imprisoned for minor offences within one to five days, and 
do the same to the rest of them whenever appropriate. Never leave anyone 
unreleased . . . . 
335. As long as prisoners are not released, keep them happy and comfortable by 
putting barbers, bathing facility, food, clothing, drink, and medicine at their 
disposal. (translation Tamás Agós, in Harvey 2018, 162)
This all raises the question of how the governments of Buddhist countries 
should treat those detained in relation to armed conflict. Avoiding indefinite 
and arbitrary detention is very much part of IHL, as is good treatment of 
detainees, especially vulnerable ones.
Verse 330 clearly delimits methods of persuasion and interrogation, which, 
under IHL, is not permitted for prisoners of war in international armed 
conflicts. Torture is clearly prohibited. For what means of persuasion are 
advocated and exemplified in Buddhist texts, we might look to the methods 
of the Buddha himself, the explanation of his reasons, the use of logic, the 
pointing out of consequences, etc.
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Protection of civilian property, the environment and animals
Whether sanctioned by military leaders or the result of indiscipline, the 
plundering and destruction of civilian property, crops and domestic animals, 
etc. is prohibited in IHL. The second Buddhist precept, ‘I undertake the 
precept to abstain from taking what is not given’ supports respect for civilian 
property. It covers stealing and other matters such as fraud and cheating. In 
Tibetan Buddhism, the 18 root bodhisattva vows include not to destroy any 
place by such means as fire, bombs or pollution. Revenge burning and 
looting or destruction of sources of food and water, including crops, are 
prohibited in the Ārya-satyaka-parivarta (Asp.197, cited in Harvey 2000, 253).
The principle of avoiding harm to the environment even in warfare is again 
illustrated in a story of Sakka, during a conflict with the jealous asura demi- 
gods (Sam.I.224, cf. Dhp-a I.279, Jat.I.202–203). When Sakka and his army are 
fleeing from the asura army through a wood, his carriage poles strike the 
nests of a certain kind of bird, resulting in the destruction of innocent life. 
Sakka immediately orders his army to stop and turn back, even at the expense 
of losing their own lives at the hands of the enemy. However, when the 
asuras see that Sakka’s enemy has turned back towards them, they assume 
this is to re-engage, so they flee; thus in this case victory comes from 
adherence to an ethical principle. This illustrates how Buddhism exceeds 
purely humanitarian concerns to encompass all sentient beings, seeking to 
protect all life as a matter of principle, though some lives – those of humans in 
particular – are regarded as more precious than others. The commentary to 
this story adds that it was young, old and ill birds that had been harmed, as 
the others had fled when hearing the noise of the approaching army, mirror-
ing IHL concerns about the vulnerability of young, old and sick human beings 
during armed conflict.
Sexual violence
Sexual violence is a rampant phenomenon during the violent and chaotic 
conditions prevalent in armed conflict. According to the UN, the phrase 
‘conflict-related sexual violence’ (CRSV) refers to ‘rape, sexual slavery, 
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilisa-
tion, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or 
indirectly linked to a conflict’ (UN 2020).36 It is also widely employed as 
a tactic by participants in armed conflicts despite its illegality. It necessa-
rily transgresses the IHL principle of military necessity, in that it serves no 
valid military purpose. It additionally transgresses the IHL principle of 
distinction as it is usually targeted towards civilians and those who are 
hors de combat.37 It further breaches IHL’s prohibition on ‘outrages upon 
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personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.38 
Some aspects of sexual violence, namely forced pregnancy, forced abor-
tion and forced sterilisation, can have the goal of modifying the demo-
graphics of a given context, and may amount to crimes against humanity 
or genocide when widespread or done in a systematic fashion.39
Early Buddhism also recognised the destructive nature of sexual violence. At 
the start of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, the text that documents the final three 
months of the Buddha’s life, the Buddha identifies ‘not abducting women and 
making them live with them by force’ as a core code of conduct for commu-
nities to maintain harmony with each other and thrive (Dn.II.74–75).
Because of the sexual element inherent in CRSV, one might be inclined to 
refer to the remedial nature of Buddhist precepts and vinaya rules on sexuality. 
The third Buddhist precept for lay people is ‘I undertake the precept to abstain 
from wrong conduct as regards sense-pleasures’. This precept, along with the 
first two – not killing and not stealing – constitute the ‘right action’ aspects of 
the eightfold noble path that summarises Buddhist ethical conduct: ‘And what 
is right action? Abstaining from taking life, from stealing, and from sexual 
misconduct: This is called right action’ (Saccavibhaṅga Sutta, translation 
Thanissaro 2005). While the interpretations of what constitutes sexual mis-
conduct vary according to the norms of different Buddhist societies and 
subcultures, it prohibits sexual behaviour that is harmful, disrespectful, breaks 
up established relationships or targets the vulnerable.40
However, while sex and reproductive oppression are the primary tools of 
CRSV, and following the third precept would therefore preclude it, CRSV is 
primarily a practice rooted in hatred, aimed at destroying personal and com-
munity identity and honour, as humiliation and as a form of torture. Whatever 
the gender of those against whom it is perpetrated, it is often predicated on 
problematic notions of gender identity, including ‘toxic masculinity’ and some 
military constructions of masculinity, that associate displays of power with 
manhood and associate vulnerability, weakness and victimhood with 
femininity.41 Of the three core defilements underlying all suffering, while 
CRSV harnesses greed or lust, it is primarily fuelled by hatred and delusion. As 
such, exalted Buddhist practices such as loving-kindness, mettā, and the gift of 
fearlessness, abhaya-dāna, are more relevant antidotes to the underlying 
hatred in this context. The heroic ideal of protecting the vulnerable (anātha), 
central to the characterisation of the bodhisattva, which – as we have 
observed – shares some parallels with the characterisation of the ideal warrior, 
provides a healthy conceptualisation of identity. Also relevant to the idea that 
domination is a false ingredient of real ‘manhood’ are the words of Sakka 
(above), that responding to anger with more anger is the action of a fool; 
calm patience is real strength, not a weakness. Also relevant are these verses 
from the Dhammapada:
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Though one might conquer a thousand times a thousand men in battle, the 
greatest conquest is of just one: oneself. (v. 103) 
Whoso, as a rolling chariot, checks his uprisen anger, him I call a charioteer; 
other folk merely hold the reins. (v. 222. Translation Peter Harvey).
Meanwhile, the foundational doctrine of anattā, ‘no-self’, referring to the lack 
of a self-essence in living beings, undermines fixed notions of identity, 
including gender. The essentialisation and reification of gender are further 
undermined by stories of gender-transformation in Mahāyāna texts such as 
the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra, which seek to ensure a profound understanding 
of anattā and see clinging to gender as an obstacle to this (Paul 1981, 69).
The problem of CRSV is exacerbated by victim-blaming and stigma, non- 
reporting and lack of accountability by perpetrators. We therefore need to 
look to Buddhist teachings on broader subjects such as reporting, account-
ability and leadership. The Vinaya Pit
_
aka, the section of the Buddhist canon 
which contains monastic rules, exemplifies the Buddhist ideals for all three, 
and – despite being compiled for the celibate Sangha – even does so in 
relation to rape. Indeed, the subject of rape is tackled early on in the vinaya 
because of the vow of celibacy. The first rule of ‘defeat’, parājika, prohibits 
monastics from sexual intercourse with themselves or another, whether 
human or non-human, male, female or third gender. But, the text asks, are 
they at fault if they are raped? Accounts of the rape of monks and nuns are 
unemotionally analysed with the conclusion that they do not constitute 
infringement of the rule because of the absence of intention, namely a lack 
of consent, as with the rape of Uppalavaṇṇā, one of the Buddha’s two chief 
nun disciples (Vin.III.35).
While many of the types of CRSV that come under the UN definition are 
not addressed in the vinaya, and discussions of consent in early Buddhist 
texts may not fulfil the highest standards possible in the modern world, 
the not-guilty conclusion is clear and absolute, with no stigma attached to 
the involuntary event, namely if one is raped, or tricked or forced into 
sexual activity against one’s will. Moreover, while the doctrine of karma has 
sometimes been interpreted to mean that victims are responsible for what 
they endure, the vinaya indicates otherwise. The perpetrator is still fully 
responsible for their action, even if they happen to be a conduit for karma 
catching up with someone else (a matter of unfortunate result, not ‘being 
deserved’). Those in charge must exert their authority. If they do not, 
anarchy – ‘the law of the fish’ – will ensue, in which the vulnerable, 
including spiritual practitioners, are at the mercy of bigger ‘fish’. In the 
vinaya narratives, if the potentially guilty parties do not report themselves, 
then their colleagues do so. The Buddha, who in the vinaya functions as 
the authoritative commander of the Sangha, takes responsibility and 
investigates each case, deciding on the alleged infringement and meting 
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out punishment consistently.42 The Buddha always concludes his judge-
ment by censuring the guilty not only for the immediate consequences of 
the act, but because of the disrepute and lack of trust it brings to the 
Sangha. The entire vinaya provides a model for reporting to senior com-
mand, the responsible exercise of senior command, the absence of 
a culture of stigma and the need to ensure that the military maintains 
its reputation.
Buddhism and the broader context
While in the above discussion we have focused on Buddhism, we note that its 
attitudes to and applicability to the conduct of war cannot be studied in 
isolation from the broader context in which it developed. Above we noticed 
the development of martial arts within later Buddhism, but even in 
Buddhism’s early Indic context the tension between ideals of non-violence 
and political reality fed a lively debate which cross-fertilised numerous reli-
gious and philosophical traditions (Singh 2017). The conduct of early 
Buddhist rulers in war was also deeply informed by or derived from ancient 
Indian manuals of law, politics and administration such as the Dharma-sūtras, 
Manu-smṛti and Arthaśāstra, and extensive episodes discussing the duties of 
kings in great epics such as Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaņa. Now more closely 
associated with Hinduism, they influenced all traditions derived from ancient 
India, guiding the regulation of society and the methods employed to gain 
and maintain temporal power. Jayatilleke (1967) discusses how Indian litera-
ture in Sanskrit such as the Śānti-parvan or ‘Book of Peace’ (twelfth book of 
the Mahābhārata43) contain developed sets of rules regularising behaviour in 
a war situation. Jayatilleke points out how these aspects of Hindu statecraft 
had in fact been shaped under the influence of Buddhist thought which 
emphasised the importance for rulers of such virtues as humaneness, non- 
violence and righteousness.
Justice Weeramantry writes (2007, 6):
Buddhist rulers actually engaged in warfare attached much importance to the 
rules of conduct in war which had been very elaborately worked out by Hindu 
jurists [i.e. the ancient Indian regulators of statecraft and warfare noted above, 
see Sinha 2005]. These jurists had worked out with great specificity the rules of 
fairness in combat such as equality of arms, protection of civilians, treatment of 
prisoners of war, permitted weaponry, and even hours of warfare.
Weeramantry cites Christopher Isherwood (1963, 247), identifying in such 
ancient warrior codes a similar spirit of restraint as is found in IHL (indeed, 
at points even going beyond what IHL would require): ‘A soldier mounted on 
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an elephant may not attack a foot-soldier. No man may be struck or shot 
while running away. No one may be killed who has lost his weapons’. 
Weeramantry (2006) further states:
[I]n Hindu law, there is tremendous richness of specific examples, specific 
teachings of how you conduct yourself in battle, how it is unethical to kill 
a person who is intoxicated or who has a broken limb or is unarmed or is 
staffed [sic]. That is equal to the killing of a child and what you have got to see is 
what principle is behind it. It is amazing how much futuristic thought has gone 
into the Hindu considerations of matters pertinent to the laws of war.
By ‘Hindu’ we should of course understand here ‘Indic’, i.e. belonging to the 
broader cultural milieu in or influenced by the Indian subcontinent, the 
broader culture that gave rise to and nurtured the forms of religion later 
identified as ‘Buddhist’, ‘Hindu’, ‘Jain’, etc. The need to make this explicit 
stems from the increasing tendency in recent decades to essentialise 
Buddhist and Hindu identities. Yet it is more informative if we recognise the 
shared cultural and scientific heritage. Even Ashoka’s Buddhism and policies 
were, as Basham has demonstrated, heavily influenced by the Arthaśāstra, the 
treatise on the exercise of political power mentioned above, which is attrib-
uted to the chief minister of Ashoka’s grandfather King Candragupta. 
Generally perceived as Hindu, and likened to Machiavelli’s The Prince in its 
psychology of power games, it provides guidance for dealing with enemies 
and maintaining rule over one’s people (Basham 1982, 133–134). As noted 
above, Buddhist narratives sometimes sought to reimagine the teachings 
found in these texts in such a way as to minimise the violence entailed in 
following their guidance.
Huxley (1995), writing on Burmese legal history since the Pagan period 
(1044–1279), demonstrates how a wide range of influences, including both 
Buddhist text and ancient Indian law manuals, similarly shaped the Burmese 
legal texts for its predominantly Buddhist society and rulers. These legal texts 
are known in Burmese as dhammathats and rajathats. A dhammathat from 
Pagan was influenced not only by the Arthaśāstra but also by some of the Pali 
texts noted above, such as the myth of the first king in the aforementioned 
Aggañña Sutta, the ‘Discourse on Origins’ (Dn.III.80–98; Huxley 1995, 52–53), 
and the commentaries that expanded on this notion of the mythical original 
king. By the early eighteenth century, a Burmese monk named ‘Khemacara in 
his monumental Vinicchayarasi dhammathat attempted to demonstrate that 
every rule in the dhammathats could be traced to a source in the Pali canon’ 
(Huxley 1995, 53). Huxley, therefore, argues that ‘the law for the laity [in 
Burma] is, in a deep sense, Buddhist’ (Huxley 1995, 47). Huxley also highlights 
a highly complex system of politics involving kings, learned monks – usually 
the monastic experts in the vinaya (vinaya-dhāra) – and lay lawyers (she-ne in 
Burmese). The dhammathat texts of pre-modern Burma set out how Buddhist 
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kings may exert power with restraints in ways that also sometimes reflect IHL 
concerns.44 Just as it is useful to explore Buddhism in relation to these aspects 
of Indic law, given their influence on and application by Buddhists over the 
centuries, we might also look to other broader cultural influences, such as the 
Confucian influence on Buddhists in East Asia, as regards conduct in war and, 
indeed, the Buddhist evaluation of the relationship between monks and the 
state.
We can see how the ongoing relationship between Buddhism and its 
socio-political contexts continues to reshape Buddhist ethics in the modern 
period as well. An example is the development of Humanistic Buddhism, 
literally ‘Buddhism for the Human Realm’ (renjian fojiao 人間佛教). 
Humanistic Buddhism seeks to apply the Mahāyāna understanding of com-
passion to minimise violence, focusing on methods to improve the world in 
the here and now. This movement formed in China and Taiwan in the early 
twentieth century as a reaction to a Buddhism that had become – in the eyes 
of the reformers – merely liturgical. It was in part also a response to radical 
political changes that affected Chinese society from the late nineteenth 
century as well as the challenges posed by Christians, who were seen to be 
more active in social sectors and welfare than Buddhists. Later in the twen-
tieth century, it became the inspiration in Vietnam for charismatic leaders 
such as Thich Nhat Hanh (b. 1926), forced to confront the horrors of the 
Vietnam War, but also to explain what people in the West saw as violent 
protest, the self-immolations on the part of Buddhist monastics beginning 
with Thich Qang Duc in 1963.45 It was he who coined the phrase ‘Engaged 
Buddhism’ in a letter to Martin Luther King, Jr., providing the name for the 
broader movement of Socially Engaged Buddhism to which he has contrib-
uted throughout his life. Both Humanistic and Socially Engaged Buddhism 
have track records in seeking to work out, as Weeramantry (2007) proposed, 
the Buddhist principles to be applied towards ‘the dignity and sanctity of 
human life, . . . attitudes toward other human beings’ and ‘respect for nature’. 
As such, they offer avenues for the application of Buddhist humanitarian 
principles, including in support of the implementation and strengthening of 
IHL to reduce the adverse effects of war on people, animals and the 
environment.
Conclusion
This article has explored some Buddhist teachings and traditions relevant to 
international humanitarian law and the conduct of armed conflict more 
generally. It has drawn primarily on the concepts and teachings of author-
itative Buddhists texts, with some references to historical and recent exam-
ples. While we were able to draw on existing research in overlapping areas, 
such as Buddhist ethics and attitudes to violence, this is the first attempt to 
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bring together a comprehensive analysis of the potential interface between 
Buddhism and IHL. Although there are plenty of writings on Buddhist teach-
ings to avoid violence, there is little – for reasons explained earlier – on how 
to realistically apply Buddhist values within armed conflict situations, and on 
how to regulate the conduct of armed conflict, such as the rules of IHL, once it 
has broken out. Indeed, there appears to have been remarkably limited 
engagement with even those parts of canonical texts that illustrate 
Buddhism’s deep familiarity with war or with those teachings that developed 
later to address the dangers of conflict situations. This void and the attendant 
lack of dialogue, not least with regard to the Buddha’s tacit acceptance of the 
realities of war while propounding radical adherence to non-violence, has 
perhaps enhanced the ‘compartmentalization of values’ noted by 
Schmithausen (1999, 53) in the context of combat, reducing the considera-
tion of Buddhist values which can reduce suffering in the very situations 
where they are most needed.
This article has shown that certain teachings in Buddhism are strikingly 
similar to IHL in their emphasis on minimising suffering during armed conflict, 
and that it is possible to draw out relevant principles and practices from 
Buddhist texts and history. A number of IHL principles and concepts mirror 
those found in Buddhism, and in some cases might as well have been taken 
straight from the Buddhist scriptures. However, many Buddhists are unaware 
of these rich Buddhist teachings on the conduct of war, or indeed of whether 
Buddhism has anything to say about the conduct of war at all. Unlike IHL, 
Buddhism has been reluctant to compromise its non-violent idealism by 
codifying rules that regulate – and therefore institutionalise – even defensive 
war. Thus, while Buddhist monks follow vinaya rules that regulate every 
aspect of their lives, lay Buddhists who wage war must refer to general 
Buddhist principles rather than an explicit code of war. So far as Buddhism 
and IHL intersect in this regard, they can complement and reinforce each 
other, and one goal of this ICRC project is to provide clear and simple 
guidance to combatants from a Buddhist perspective. Beyond the law, 
Buddhism addresses the underlying intentions and motivations of parties to 
conflict, and possesses the psychological insights and resources to better 
train and enable them to regulate themselves.
Thinking of future scholarship on the subject, these matters could be 
looked at from multiple perspectives, drawing on Buddhist texts, practices 
and past examples, and from the experience of those who have been 
involved in such situations. The investigation of Buddhism’s psychological 
resources and mindfulness technologies is crucial in this respect, since they 
have the potential to increase the resilience of combatants and to enhance 
their inclination and capacity to adhere to humanitarian norms in high-stress 
conflict situations. These matters should be viewed from the perspective of all 
those involved in armed conflict. Reflections and advice from current and 
52 A. BARTLES-SMITH ET AL.
former Buddhist combatants, ex-soldier monks and perhaps also ex-monk 
soldiers, also fall within the scope of the project, since experience of the 
realities of warfare can only enhance the credibility of this research and point 
to its practical application. Also, if Buddhist researchers and practitioners are 
to succeed in this task, it is crucial that they first acquaint themselves with the 
core principles and mechanics of IHL, which aims to balance military necessity 
with humanity, protect the lives and dignity of non-combatants, and safe-
guard the environment during armed conflict. Many of the themes outlined 
in this exploratory article have already been taken up as part of the ICRC 
project on Buddhism and IHL. Leading on from this research and engagement 
with Buddhist and military experts and practitioners, our eventual goal is to 
improve the conduct of hostilities on the ground.
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1. See: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/sri-lanka-global-conference-interface- 
between-buddhism-and-ihl; https://www.icrc.org/en/document/reducing- 
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the final stages of the spiritual path, the lowest of which ensures attainment of 
Nirvana within a maximum of seven lives, the majority of lay people, and indeed 
many ordinary monks, are not at this level or seeking these goals in this life.
8. On the related issue of Buddhism and human rights, see e.g. Keown, Prebish 
and Husted (1998), Perera (2010), Rouner (1988) and Weeraratne (1980).
9. However, it is said (Dhp-a.I.399ff) that Viḍūḍabha, the Koliya king, later 
destroyed the Sākiyas in revenge for an insult that he suffered from them.
10. On the five precepts, see Harvey (2000, 66–88).
11. For discussions of the issue of whether, and the extent to which, violence can be 
justified in Theravāda Buddhism, see e.g. Deegalle (2002, 2017a, 2017b), Gethin 
(2004), Dhammananda (1993), Harris (2010), Keown (2015), Khantipalo (1986, 
213) and Stroble (1991). For Mahāyāna Buddhism, see e.g. Tatz (1994). For more 
general discussions of the ethics of war, see e.g. Johnson and Kelsay (1990) and 
Reichberg, Syse, and Begby (2006).
12. We first see non-Buddhist doctrines that deny karmic consequences explicitly 
rejected in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya of the Pali canon (Dn 2), 
and, more explicitly, in the Tittha Sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (An 3.61). It 
continues as a theme in the working out of the implications of any doctrine, 
particularly in response to Mahāyāna idealist tendencies, which, even when 
adopting the view that the world including living beings is illusory, nonetheless 
affirm that the ethics of the path continue to have consequences, as long as all 
continue to function within the realms of conventional rather than ultimate 
truth, i.e. while some remain unenlightened.
13. This idea is sometimes used in a debatable way, as seen in the contentious 




hagāmiṇi after the war in 
the fifth-century chronicle the Mahāvaṃsa (Mvm XXV, 109–111; Geiger 1912, 
178; discussed by Crosby 2014, 382 and in Harvey 2021).
14. Buddhas are seen to choose the moment of their death and so cannot be killed.
15. For an exploration of cetanā/intention within different genres of Pali literature, 
see Devdas (2004, 2008) and Heim (2014).
16. See Jenkins (2010) for an overview of the arguments as well as some complex 
ethical issues related to this, such as a story in which the Buddha does not 
intervene in a murder that he knows is about to take place.
17. On how this ideal may inform ethics of governance, see Saddhatissa (1970, 149– 
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18. Also known as the Mahosadha Jātaka; see Kumaratunga (1979) and, newly 
translated, in Appleton and Shaw (2015, 187–333).
19. See Rahula (1974, 85), Eppsteiner (1988, 103–109), Deegalle (2017a, 25–28), and 
more generally, in this edited book, 84–85, 94–99, 154. On a Tibetan ideal of 
kingship see Mipham (2017).
20. See also Hopkins and Rinpoche (1975).
21. Jamspal (Asp.2, 46) holds that it was composed sometime between the second 
century BCE and the first century CE, and says that it was the favourite handbook 
of many teachers in Tibet, such as Tsong kha pa, particularly in their advice to 
rulers.
22. For the role of this sūtra in Chinese history, and the concept of Buddhist 
‘protection of the state’, see Wei (2012).
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23. However, the commentaries (Jat.II.237, 403; IV.342 f) say that, in order to put 
a final end to the continuing hostilities, Pasenadi gives his own daughter 
Vajirakumārikā in marriage to Ajātasattu.
24. For the inscriptions of Ashoka, see Nikam and McKeon (1959); for a biography of 
Ashoka see Guruge (1993, especially 109–122, 161–172); also https://www. 
katinkahesselink.net/tibet/asoka1.html. For a study of the different legends of 
Ashoka, see Strong (1983). On how this goes against Hindu dharmaśāstra, see 
Harvey (2000, 253). For more detailed analyses of Ashoka’s inscriptions, see 
Norman 1990–1996, and for an assessment of how these relate to statecraft, 
particularly the Arthaśāstra, see Basham (1982). On the episode of Asoka’s 
purification of the Sangha and sending out of missionaries narrated in the 
Samantapāsādā commentary on the vinaya, see Gethin (2012, 24–27).
25. In Chinese history we have rulers who were recognised as or claimed them-
selves to be cakravartins; two eminent examples are the Tang Empress Wu 
Zetian 武則天 (624–705 CE), who shaved her head and spent time in a Buddhist 
nunnery, and the founding Emperor of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元 
璋 (1328–1398), who had been a Buddhist novice monk in the past. The details 
available concerning these periods of Chinese history indicate that both lacked 
many of the virtues and features that Buddhist scriptures ascribe to 
a cakravartin ruler, however, and provide two Chinese examples of the distance 
between ‘ideal/scriptural Buddhism’ and ‘living Buddhism’, including how 
Buddhist principles have been exploited to fulfil mundane purposes. About 
Wu Zetian, see Ch’en (1964, 219–222, 428) and Paul (1989). About Zhu 
Yuanzhang, see Ch’en (1964, 431–435) and Hung (2016).
26. For such an interpretation, see Jerryson (2018, 466).
27. For other material from Western Buddhist soldiers, see e.g. Bosco (2014); 
Buddhist Military Sangha; Peto (2014).
28. See Draper and Sripokangkul (2017) on the system of compulsory military 
service in Thailand: ‘Under the 1954 Military Service Act, Thai men aged 21 
are called in for selection for military service, involving a lottery, meaning 
conscription is not universal. Men who have completed a bachelor’s degree 
and volunteer for the military normally serve for six months, but if drafted via 
lottery, they serve for one year. Men who have completed secondary education 
through Grade 12 or vocational school and volunteer also serve for one year, or 
two years when drafted via lottery. In secondary and tertiary education pro-
grammes, male and female students aged 15 to 22 years may take the territorial 
defence curriculum, which takes five years to complete, with three years pro-
viding draft exemption’. Tambiah’s statement (1976, 489) that all are required to 
do two years military service is inaccurate, perhaps the result of 
a misunderstanding of the ‘two years’ for those drawn in the lottery who do 
not have higher education.
29. For discussions of military chaplaincy more generally, see Brekke and Tikhonov 
(2017) and Stahl (2017).
30. See e.g. Stanley and Jha (2009). ‘Emotional face processing’ refers to the 
accurate assessment of people’s emotions and non-verbal cues from their facial 
expressions.
31. On the use of mindfulness training in the British armed forces, see Carter and 
Mortlock (2019); British Army Mindfulness course: https://www.army.mod.uk/ 
people/join-well/managing-stress/mindfulness-course/; and a three-year study 
at City University, London: ‘Mindfulness in the Military: Improving Mental 
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Fitness in the UK Armed Forces Using Next Generation Team Mindfulness 
Training’: https://www.city.ac.uk/news/2019/may/improving-mental-fitness-in- 
uk-armed-forces-using-team-mindfulness-training. For mindfulness in the US 
armed forces, see Richtel (2019). For a critique of mindfulness in the military, 
see Purser (2014).
32. On mindfulness and PTSD, see e.g. Hoffman (2016).
33. For example, Buddhist monks led revolts in sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
Southeast Asia. However, there are also more recent examples, such as the 
Theravāda Buddhist monk U Thuzana who led the Democratic Karen Buddhist 
Army, an ethnic insurgent group operating from 1994 to 2010 in Myanmar, and 
Thai soldiers who ordain as monks, while holding on to their weapons to 
protect temples in Southern Thailand (Frydenlund 2013).




35. Internment in international armed conflicts may be imposed under the 
Fourth Geneva Convention for ‘imperative reasons of security’. It must end 
as soon as those security reasons cease to exist or, at the latest, when 
hostilities cease. The convention contains procedural rules that aim to ensure 
states do not abuse the considerable margin of discretion they have in 
interpreting threats to their security. Recent state practice in international 
armed conflicts has demonstrated significant divergences in the interpreta-
tion and implementation of the rules, which has given rise to serious concern. 
In non-international armed conflicts, the position is no clearer, as Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not address procedural safeguards 
in internment (it provides for the application of basic judicial guarantees for 
persons subject to criminal proceedings): https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ 
security-detention.
36. See Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to 
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/ 
wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020.08-UN-CRSV-Handbook.pdf.
37. The principle of military necessity permits only that degree and kind of force 
required to achieve the legitimate purpose of a conflict, i.e. the complete or 
partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the 
minimum expenditure of life and resources. It does not, however, permit the 
taking of measures that would otherwise be prohibited under IHL (https://www. 
icrc.org/en/document/what-ihl). Hors de combat specifically refers to members 
of the armed forces who are out of action through wounds or surrender, not all 
protected persons.
38. This wording of the prohibition appears in Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. The prohibition is repeated in Article 75(2)(b) of 
Additional Protocol I (for international armed conflict) and Article 4(2)(e) of 
Additional Protocol II (for non-international armed conflict). The wording of the 
provision in Additional Protocol II specifies that such treatment includes ‘rape, 
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault’.
39. See e.g. Articles 6(d) and 7(1)(g) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94 
-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf.
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40. For a discussion of the third precept and various ways in which it is interpreted, 
see Harvey (2000, 71–74).
41. On the topic of masculinity in general in Buddhism, see Powers (2009).
42. On the authority of the Buddha in the vinaya and the way in which the vinaya 
functions, see Huxley (1996b). Huxley points out that the persona of the Buddha 
in the vinaya is more commanding and authoritative than in the sutta texts, 
where he has to be more persuasive since the suttas address a wider audience. 
At Dn.II.100, the Buddha actually says that he does not see himself as in charge 
of the Sangha, but the stories that explain the establishment of each of the rules 
in the vinaya place him in a position of absolute authority.
43. http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/m12/index.htm and http://www.rsvidya 
peetha.ac.in/mahabharatha/summary/eng/12.pdf.
44. Huxley’s numerous writings on Buddhism and law as well as Christian 
Lammerts’ doctoral dissertation (2010) on the subject are particularly helpful 
in this regard. Other works on Buddhism and law are: De Silva (2017), Huxley 
(1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1997), Premasiri (2018), Ratnapala (1971), Tilakaratne 
(2018) and Weeramantry (1998, 2006).
45. For an example of his teachings, see Nhat Hanh (1987).
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Abbreviations
References to Pali texts using these abbreviations are to PTS editions of the Pali texts. 
References to other texts are to the editions or translations given here.
An. Aṅguttara Nikāya; tr. Bhikkhu Bodhi. 2011. The Incremental Discourses of the 
Buddha. Boston: Wisdom Press.
Akb. Abhidharmakośa-bhās
_
yam (of Vasubandhu – mostly Sarvāstivāda); tr. 
L. M. Pruden (from L. de La Valleé Poussin’s French translation). 1991. 
Abhidharmakośabhās
_





hasālinī; tr. Pe Maung Tin. 1920 and 1921. The Expositor. 2 vols. London: Pali 
Text Society.
Asp. Ārya-satyaka-parivarta; tr. L. Jamspal. 1991. The Range of the Bodhisattva: 
A Study of an Early Mahāyānasūtra, ‘Āryasatyakaparivarta’, Discourse of the Truth 
Teller. Columbia University Ph.D. diss., reproduced on microfiche, Ann Arbor: UMI. 
References are to page numbers of the translation published in 2010 as The Range of 
the Bodhisattva: A Mahāyāna Sūtra. New York: American Institute of Buddhist 
Studies.
Bca. Bodhicaryāvatāra; tr. K. Crosby and A. Skilton. 1995. Śāntideva: The 
Bodhicaryāvatāra. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Dhp. Dhammapada; tr. V. Roebuck. 2010. The Dhammapada. London: Penguin. 
Buddharakkhita 1985 and T
_
hānissaro translations on Access to Insight website: 





hakathā, commentary on Dhp; tr. E. W. Burlingame. 1921. Buddhist Legends. 3 
vols., Harvard Oriental Series. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921. Repr. 1995 
London: Pali Text Society, 1995.
Dn. Dīgha Nikāya; tr. M. Walshe. 1996. Long Discourses of the Buddha. 2nd revised 
edition, one vol. Boston: Wisdom Press.
IHL International humanitarian law.
Jat. Jātaka with Commentary; tr. by various hands under E. B. Cowell. 1895–1907. 
The Jātaka or Stories of the Buddha’s Former Births, 6 vols., London: Pali Text Society.
Khp-a. Commentary on Khuddaka-pāt
_
ha; tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli. 1960. Minor 
Readings and Illustrator. London: Pali Text Society.
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Mn. Majjhima Nikāya; tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi. 1995. The Middle 
Length Discourses of the Buddha, Boston: Wisdom Publications.
M-a. Untranslated commentary on Mn.
Mvm. Mahāvaṃsa; ed. Geiger 1908; tr. W. Geiger and M. H. Bode. 1912. The 
Mahāvaṃsa or Great Chronicle of Ceylon. London: Pali Text Society.
Mvs. Mahāvastu; tr. J. J. Jones. 1949–1956. The Mahāvastu: Translated from the 
Buddhist Sanskrit. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society.
PTS Pali Text Society
Sam. Saṃyutta Nikāya; tr. Bhikkhu Bodhi. 2003. The Connected Discourses of the 
Buddha. A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Sn. Sutta-nipāta; tr. K. R. Norman. 1984. The Group of Discourses. In paperback: The 
Rhinoceros Horn and Other Early Buddhist Poems. London: Pali Text Society. Tr. 
K. R. Norman, 1992. The Group of Discourses. Vol. II. Revised translation with introduc-
tion and notes. London: Pali Text Society.




aka; tr. I. B. Horner. 1938–1966. The Book of the Discipline. 6 vols. 
London: Pali Text Society. Vin. III and IV are translated respectively as Book of the 
Discipline, vols. I plus II (pp. 1–163), and II (pp. 164–416) plus III, with Vin. I and II as Book 
of the Discipline, vols. IV and V, and Vin. V is Book of the Discipline VI.
Vism. Visuddhimagga (of Buddhaghosa); tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli. 1956. The Path of 
Purification (Visuddhimagga) by Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa. Colombo: R. Semage. 
Repr. 1999. Onalaska: Pariyatti.
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